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Whigs in Court: Historiographical
Problems with Expert Evidence
Gary Edmond*
I. INTRODUCTION
The trouble with all this is that it is setting the jury to decide,
where doctors disagree.... But how can the jury judge between
two statements each founded upon an experience confessedly
foreign in kind to their own?
-Learned Hand (1901)1
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Learned Hand ex-
pressed concern at the assessment of expert disagreement by the lay
jury. While the debate over jury competence has continued, Hand's
disquiet would appear to apply equally to historians, lawyers, and
judges commenting on litigation involving protracted disputes
between experts Hand's comment may actually raise the method-
ological question: how should historians and legal commentators
approach and explain disagreements among experts and scientists
during trials and appeals? This Article endeavors to sketch some
tentative answers to that question, primarily through the review of
several cases exemplifying the recent historiographical treatment of
expert evidence. Recent approaches are conspicuous because, where
B.A. (Hons), University of Wollongong, L.L.B. (Hons), University of Sydney, Ph.D.,
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1. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REv. 40,54 (1901).
2. Id For a more general historical introduction see CAROL JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES:
SCIENCE, MEDICINE AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1994) and Tal Golan, The Ihstory of
Scientific Expert Testimony in the Engblsh Courtroom, 12 SC. CONTEXT 7 (1999).
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they focus on the evidentiary contests, they invariably draw upon
idealized images of scientific knowledge and practice and usually
attribute putatively proper values to the evidence -values frequently
based on popular or official rationalizations of the litigation-and
use them to interpret the entire litigation presupposing the con-
tinued existence and availability of those purportedly stable values.
This later tendency might be described as whiggish, for it involves
the decontextualized comparison of evidence from earlier trials and
appeals with an allegedly proper value subsequently attributed at the
(apparent) conclusion of the litigation. These approaches might also
be characterized as sociologies of error, for they exhibit a tendency
to explain purportedly unreliable evidence in sociological terms and
purportedly reliable evidence on the basis of its intrinsic epistemic
worth. The tendency to accept the value accorded to the evidence at
the close of proceedings, trivializing the contingent and strategic
processes involved in its production, articulation, and assessment,
tends to invest the entire proceedings with a particular moral con-
figuration that often facilitates recrimination and proposals for
procedural reform.
In contrast, this Article aims to illustrate how such approaches to
expert evidence achieve their coherence and plausibility on the basis
of simplistic and artificial images of the sciences and at the cost of
detailed attention to the legally influenced diachronic contest sur-
rounding the resolution of expert disagreement. The celebration of
putatively correct outcomes prevents analysts from asking more
fundamental questions about why some types of knowledge are con-
sidered (and represented as) reliable and others unreliable, how that
status is achieved through the course of adversarial litigation and
whether legal institutions can or should be predominantly concerned
with truth, or whether commitment to other, perhaps equally elusive,
values such as defendants' rights, procedural fairness, and justice
transform legal settings into quite peculiar epistemic domains.3
3. This usage is not intended to reify "justice" or "procedural fairness." Just as with the
concept of "truth," in this Article it is suggested that their meanings be interpreted in context,
as part of the flexible and contested matrix stimulated by adversarial litigation. The content or
meaning of "truth" (or reliable knowledge/evidence), "rules," "justice," and "procedure" are
all potentially "up for grabs" in the course of adversarial litigation. The primacy of "justice"
and the role accorded to "truth" seem to be a point of tension in recent discussions of evidence
and procedure. See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT
ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE ANDTHE LAW
(Kenneth Foster et al. eds., 1993); see generally PAUL GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER
SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT AND ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE (1994); ALAN
SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, INTELLECTUAL IMPOSTURES (1998).
[Vol. 14:123
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A. The Temporal, Epistemic, and Social Context: Wbig Historio-
graphy, Methodological Symmetry, and Idealized Images of Science
The foundations for the following discussion are predicated upon a
combination of three theoretical approaches drawn from the history
of science and the sociology of scientific knowledge. The first is
derived from Herbert Butterfield's classic monograph, The Whig
Interpretation of History,' and the second is David Bloor's sym-
metrical postulate described in Knowledge and Social Imagery The
third seeks to incorporate a series of historical and empirical assaults
on positivist, ahistorical, and idealized images of scientific knowledge
and practice drawn from post-Kuhnian empirical and ethnographic
studies of the sciences and historiography.6
According to Butterfield it was "part and parcel of the whig
interpretation of history that it studies the past with reference to the
present."7 The whig interpretation provides a simplified framework
through which to interpret the complexities of history, enabling the
historian fallaciously to "cut through this complexity."' In effect, it
represents a "short cut," a strategically abridged version of history
rationalized on the basis of adherence to a retrospectively informed
(set of) organising principle(s).9 This enables the historian to classify
historical actors into those who "furthered progress and the men
who tried to hinder it; so that a handy rule of thumb exists by which
4. HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (W.W. Norton &
Co., 1965) (1931).
5. DAVID BLOOR, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY (1991). The approach developed
by Bloor is commonly described as the Strong Programme, and in combination with work by
David Edge, Barry Barnes, and Donald MacKenzie, also characterized as the Edinburgh
School.
6. For an early and influential statement of post-Kuhnian historiography of the sciences,
consider Steven Shapin, History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions, 20 HIST. SCI.
157 (1982). For more particular historical and sociological concern with expert evidence and
litigation, see EXPERT EVIDENCE: INTERPRETING SCIENCE IN THE LAW (Roger Smith & Brian
Wynne eds., 1989); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995); JONES, supra note 2; BRIAN WYNNE, RATIONALITY AND
RITUAL: THE WINDSCALE INQUIRY AND NUCLEAR DECISIONS IN BRITAIN (1982); Contested
Identities: Science, Law and Forensic Practice, 28 SOC. STUD. SCI. 675 (Mike Lynch & Sheila
Jasanoff eds., 1998); Science and Law, 12 SCI. CONTEXT 3 (Tal Golan & Snait Gissis eds.,
1999).
7. BUTrERFIELD, supra note 4, at 11. Another frequently cited description of whiggism is
"The study of the past with one eye, so to speak, upon the present is the source of all sins and
sophistries in history.... It is the essence of what we mean by the word 'unhistorical."' Id. at
31-32. For further discussion consider A. Rupert Hall, Can the History of Science Be History?
4 BRIT. J. HIST. SCI. 207, 217 (1969); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The
Case offHistory-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909,914-17 (1996).
8. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 4, at 14, 21, 22.
9. Id. at 22-23, 40, 43, 96-103. See also Mary Hesse, Reasons and Evaluation in the History
of Science, in CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 127 (M. Teich & R.
Young eds., 1973).
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the historian can select and reject and can make points of
emphasis."'"
On occasion Butterfield suggested that some of the pitfalls
associated with whig history might be remedied through careful
attention to historical detail. Notoriously, he remarked that "if at any
point we need further elucidation all that he [the historian] can do is
to take us into greater detail, and make us see in still more definite
concreteness what really did take place."'" That suggestion, drawing
an analogy between historical practice and optical magnification, has
generated criticism on the ground that it proposes a "specious
inductivism." The available historical record cannot be legitimately
equated with the richness of the past, nor can ever-decreasing minu-
tiae of facts "assemble themselves atheoretically into explanations.' ' 2
While the following account emphasizes the importance of richly
textured contextual historiography, it makes no attempt to suggest
that context alone is sufficient to account for all social activity.3
Perhaps more importantly, it serves to demonstrate that even
accounts of expert evidence that provide tremendous contextual
detail nevertheless risk serious historiographical limitations if they
embrace historically and empirically implausible models of scientific
knowledge and practice.'
10. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 4, at 11. See also Paschal Phillips, The "Whig Interpret-
ation" ofMonastic History, 31 ABR 201 (1980).
11. BUTrERFIELD, supra note 4, at 72; See also Adrian Wilson & T.G. Ashplant, Whig
History and Present-Centred History, 31 HIST. J. 1, 7 (1988).
12. A. Rupert Hall, On Whiggism, 21 HIST. SCi. 45, 51-52 (1983). Butterfield and his
student, Hall, seem to have accepted the proposition that greater attention to detail would
prevent some whiggish tendencies. However, in adopting that proposition they appear to have
underestimated the profound influence of assumptions about the sciences and asymmetrical
explanations in shaping analysis in the history of the sciences. Consequently, more recent
critics have suggested that one potential means of improvement is to abandon "present-
centred concepts and to reconstruct the activities of agents in their original context" because
flawed categories, such as idealized models of science, may well survive and subordinate the
experience and findings of historical research. T.G. Ashplant & Adrian Wilson, Present-
Centred History and the Problem oflHstorical Knowledge, 31 HIST. J. 253, 260-61(1988).
13. See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. &
THEORY 3 (1969). Skinner provided influential criticism of the existence of perennial problems
in the history of ideas, and the inability of context to fully account for ideas. See also John
Dunn, The Identity of the History of Ideas, 43 PHIL. 85 (1968). Similar objections have been
raised in response to sociological attempts to explain behaviour and the success of some ideas
on the basis of attributed interests. See BARRY BARNES, INTERESTS AND THE GROWTH OF
KNOWLEDGE (1977); Michel Callon & Bruno Latour, Don't Throw the Baby out with the Bath
School! A Reply to Collins and Yearly, in SCIENCE AS PRACTICE AND CULTURE 343 (Andrew
Pickering ed., 1992); Harry Collins & Steven Yearly, .Epistemological Chicken, in SCIENCE AS
PRACTICE AND CULTURE, supra, at 301; Donald MacKenzie, Interests, Positivism and istory,
11 SOC. STUD. SCI. 498 (1981); Steve Woolgar, Interests and Explanation in the Social Study of
Science, 11 SOC. STUD. SCI. 365 (1981).
14. See Ashplant & Wilson, supra note 12, at 6; Hall, supra note 12, at 51-52. But see John
Diggins, The Oyster and the Pearl: The Problem of Contextuaism in Intellectual History, 23
HIST. & THEORY 151 (1984). Significantly, Diggins's analysis makes what amounts to routine
[Vol. 14:123
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Accepting that Butterfield's text has been subjected to consider-
able criticism, primarily for lack of clarity and its inability to suggest
a solution to the fact that contemporary assumptions and values
influence all historical practice, 5 including his own influential history
of science," in this Article, the term "whig" will be restricted to
denote the practice of employing (more) recent perspectives to inter-
pret, often critically or ironically, earlier values, commitments, and
actions. 7 In relation to studies of litigation, the whig historian (or
legal whig) will be shown to demonstrate a tendency to accept and
privilege the standing of the evidence or findings at the outcome of
legal proceedings, and to assess earlier performances and interpret-
ations of the evidence against them. That is, legal whiggism is
rendered conspicuous through a tendency to be present-centred in
its evaluation of the past. 8 Unlike its political counterpart, the
appellation "legal whiggism" does not necessarily entail a glori-
fication of the progression of certain cherished principles. Instead, it
often results in a critical account of the treatment of a particular case
in a manner that leads to proposals for legal reform.
The second analytical tool is methodological symmetry.19 In an
attempt to extend the efforts of earlier sociologists of knowledge
such as Mannheim and Durkheim, ° the philosopher David Bloor
proposed a systematic extension to the study of the sciences designed
to incorporate an examination of the production and content of
reference to a broader context to support his various arguments that attempt to displace
intellectual history from a specific contextual milieu.
15. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. DRAY, ON HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHERS OF HISTORY 164-90
(1989); Ashplant & Wilson, supra note 12; William H. Dray, J.H Hexter, Neo- Whiggism and
Early Stuart Historiography, 26 HIST. & THEORY 133 (1987); G.R. Elton, Herbert Butterfield
and the Study of History, 27 HIST. J. 729 (1984); Hall, supra note 12; Wilson & Ashplant, supra
note 11.
16. HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE 1300-1800 (1950). For
criticism see Andrew Cunningham & Perry Williams, De-centring the "Big Picture": The
Origins of Modern Science and the Modern Origins of Science, 26 BRIT. J. HIST. SCI. 407
(1993). Also consider the qualified defense by Regis Cabral, Herbert Butterfield (1900-79) as a
Christian Historian of Science, 27 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 547 (1996).
17. This is consistent with the framing of Butterfield's major concerns espoused by
Marshall Poe, Butterfield's Sociology of Whig History: A Contribution to the Study of
Anachronism in Modem Historical Thought, 25 CLIO 345 (1996), and the notion of "present-
centredness" articulated by Wilson & Ashplant, supra note 11, at 11.
18. "Present-centredness" is Ashplant and Wilson's refinement of Butterfield's concept of
whiggism. In their analysis, whiggism is merely one aspect of present-centredness-typified by
a particular concern with value judgements and origins. Ashplant & Wilson, supra note 12, at
261.
19. BLOOR, supra note 5, at 1-23.
20. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE
(1915); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (1938); KARL MANN-
HEIM, ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1952); KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY
AND UTOPIA (1936). For a discussion see MICHAEL MULKAY, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIOLOGY
OF KNOWLEDGE 1-26 (1979).
20021
5
Edmond: Whigs in Court
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 14:123
scientific knowledge. Conceptually, this approach extended well
beyond the circumstances surrounding the direction and degree of
scientific investigation, such as funding, personal and professional
recognition, and reward, that had characterized an externally
oriented sociology of science exemplified by the work of Robert
Merton and other primarily North American scholars.21 Bloor's
approach was a response to an apparent reluctance to describe the
social conditions attending the production as well as the actual con-
tent of ostensibly reliable knowledge in the sociology, philosophy,
and, to a lesser extent, the history of the sciences.22 Bloor was con-
cerned that previous attempts to explain the production and content
of scientific knowledge were routinely divided, asymmetrically, into
those representing true knowledge and those representing false
knowledge. Following from this division, most commentators pro-
ceeded as though only the activities of scientists who had produced
false (or flawed) knowledge could (or needed to) be explained socio-
logically; on the basis of the entry of egregious social factors such as
ideology or other inappropriate attitudes and assumptions. These
accounts are sometimes referred to as "sociologies of error," because
they provide an explanation for why a research program failed.' For
21. See, e.g., BERNARD BARBER, SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER (1952); JOSHUA BEN-
DAVID, THE SCIENTIST'S ROLE IN SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1971); WARREN
HAGSTROM, THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (1965); ROBERT MERTON, SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (Harper & Row 1970)
(1938) [hereinafter MERTON, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & SOCIETY]; ROBERT MERTON, THE
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1973); THE
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (Bernard Barber & Walter Hirsch eds., 1962). For an overview and
discussion, consider DAVID HESS, SCIENCE STUDIES: AN ADVANCED INTRODUCrION 52-80
(1997), and BARRY BARNES, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 99-124
(1974).
22. In the historiography of the sciences, there have been several pioneering historians
who examined the role of purportedly "non-scientific" influences in the work of some of the
most distinguished early modern natural philosophers. For example, alchemical and natural
magical ideas of action at a distance may have been influential on the gravitational work of
Newton and its cautious reception by natural philosophers of the mechanical persuasion. See,
e.g., ALAN DEBUS, THE ENGLISH PARACELSIANS (1966); BETTY DOBBS, THE FOUNDATIONS
OF NEWTON'S ALCHEMY, OR "THE HUNTING OF THE GREEN LYON" (1975); BRIAN EASLEA,
WITCH-HUNTING, MAGIC AND THE NEW PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEBATES
OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 1450-1750 (1980); FRANCES YATES, GIORDANA BRUNO
AND THE HERMETIC TRADITION (1964); Keith Hutchinson, What Happened to the Occult
Qualities in the Scientific Revolution 73 ISIS 233 (1982); J. McGuire & P. Rattansi, Newton
and the 'Pipes of Pan," 21 NOTES & REC. ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON 108 (1966). For an
indication of the influence of the practical arts, the printing press, and broader social circum-
stances, consider ELIZABETH EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE
(1979); MERTON, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & SOCIETY, supra note 21; PAOLO ROSSI, PHILOS-
OPHIY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE ARTS IN THE EARLY MODERN ERA (S. Attanasio trans.,
1970); Boris Hessen, The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's Principia, in SCIENCE AT
THE CROSSROADS (N. Bukharin ed., 1931).
23. See Ashplant & Wilson, supra note 12, at 257-59; R.W.K. Hinton, Five Points About
Whig History, 9 HIST. TODAY 720, 722 (1959); John Pickstone, Past and Preseni Knowledges
in the Practice of the History ofScience, 33 HIs. SCI. 203, 210 (1995). All of these works refer
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historians, this type of explanation invariably involves retrospective
assessment and implicitly access to the historically vindicated (or
tested) correct outcome. As we shall see, this retrospective or
whiggish dimension has become an important impediment to more
symmetrically oriented approaches to expert evidence. Alternatively,
accounts of scientific developments that are characterized as
fundamentally correct require little, if any, social explanation. They
purport to be fully explained, or more accurately determined, by the
evidence or Nature.
In response, Bloor proposed to erode the division and require that
both true and false approaches and conclusions should be explained
utilizing the same type of accounting resources; that is, subject to the
same type of causal explanation. This then, is the meaning of
methodological symmetry. Bloor endeavors to explain the produc-
tion and deployment of all knowledge using similar types of ex-
planation. In this way the character of Nature cannot be used to
arbitrate disagreement about its character." Appeals to Nature,
proper method, community acceptance, logic, or the evidence should
not be invoked (or accepted by the analyst) to make some types of
knowledge claim appear self-evident or obvious. The adoption of
methodological symmetry directs attention to the reasons-
frequently social reasons as knowledge and methods form part of
technical and public disputes-surrounding the (often temporary)
ascendancy of particular knowledge claims. For the purposes of this
Article, the attribution of intrinsic value to some particular con-
figuration of the evidence should not, without more, be understood
as sufficient to explain the outcomes of trials and appeals. Indeed,
this is so even before peculiarly legal and procedural factors are
introduced into the matrix."
Use of the symmetry postulate, like contextual sensitivities derived
from theoretical concerns about whiggism, requires specific attention
to the situated production and reception of knowledge claims.26 It
to asymmetrical tendencies in their discussions of whig-related historiography.
24. HARRY COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER: REPLICATION AND INDUCTION IN SCIENTIFIC
PRACTICE (1985); BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND
ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1987).
25. Adversarial jurisdictions provide fertile conditions for symmetrical analysis because
the various parties tend to develop antagonistic cases and evidence, anticipating and
responding to the opposing case. In analyzing the competing knowledge claims, commentators
should not simply accept one version without reflecting upon the influence of rules and
procedures as well as the traditions of application and other, purportedly, extra-legal
influences which are all constitutive of what is relevant and admissible evidence.
26. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Alan
Sheridan Smith trans., 1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN
ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1973); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE
83-85 (Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980); Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges, in SIMIANS,
2002]
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should encourage the analyst to embark on a comprehensive assess-
ment of all the expert knowledges, involving an attempt to explain
variations in the status of knowledge claims (the relevance and cred-
ibility of experts) as well as differing representations of their pro-
duction, articulation, and recognition at particular times and places."
At this juncture it is appropriate to complete the theoretical
introduction by problematizing the prevalent use of simplistic and
abstract images of scientific knowledge and practice.28 Adopting this
course should serve to prevent analysts from rigidly adhering to con-
trovertible a priori images of the sciences to inform (and reinforce)
their asymmetrical analyses of true and false beliefs. Historians of
science will presumably be conversant with a range of post-Kuhnian
approaches to the sciences. Those approaches, however, may be less
familiar to legal historians, legal commentators, and judges.29 Though
the following overview is not definitive, it does evince some sense of
the dynamics and issues of particular concern to a large number of
specialist historians and sociologists of science. To some extent it
may operate as a historiographical minimalist position, regardless of
CYBORGS AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 183 (1991).
27. See, e.g., SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM, DISCOURSE AND REALISM (Ian Parker ed.,
1998); Callon & Latour, supra note 13; Collins & Yearly, supra note 13; Derek Edwards et al.,
Death and Furniture: The Rhetoric, Politics, and Theology of Bottom Line Arguments Against
Relativism, 8 HIST. HUM. SCI. 25 (1995). Accepting that symmetry tends to encourage an
epistemologically relativist stance should not prevent non-relativists from adopting it as an
attitude or methodological stricture rather than as an epistemology. The analyst is free to
prefer a particular position or accept a hierarchy, but in doing so should explain the reasons for
that preference, without dismissing opposing claims as irrational. Relativism does not require
that all knowledge be treated and conceived as equal in value, and this is where the contextual
plausibility of accounts, shared assumptions among groups, and the ability to be able to
accomplish things all come into play. For debates around images of technical efficacy, consider
WIEBE BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITE AND BULBS: TOWARD A THEORY OF
SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1995); THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF TECHNOLOGY: HOW THE
REFRIGERATOR GOT ITS HUM (Donald MacKenzie & Judy Wajcman eds., 1985).
28. In adopting the terms simplistic, idealized and idealistic, traditional and conventional
as adjectives for a particular approach to scientific knowledge and practice, I have endeavored
to produce an ideal-type or generalized representation to facilitate analysis. This image is
deliberately similar to the more popular and general images of science captured by Michael's
concept of science-in-general. That is, an image of science that lacks the messiness of local
contingency characteristic of science-in-particular. See Mike Michael, Lay Discourses of
Science: Science-in-General, Science-in-Particular, and Self 17 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES
313 (1992).
29. See generally David Caudill & Richard Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The
Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 685
(2000); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Representing the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
and Law, 19 SCI. COMM. 307 (1998). Significantly, legal commentators and judges seem to be
more comfortable and sophisticated in their discussion and analysis of law and legal procedure
which, unlike scientific evidence, they are less likely to reify. This will be illustrated in the
example of Nobles and Schiff's account of some of the scientific evidence in the case of the
Birmingham Six (Part III.B, infra) where their analysis of judicial review appears more
sophisticated than the accompanying discussion of scientific evidence.
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the particular epistemologies adopted by historians or attributed to
scientists."
So, as a general overview,3 it is probably fair to say that many
contemporary historians and sociologists of science would dismiss, as
implausible, the existence of an historically stable, universal, pres-
criptive, and efficacious scientific method doctrine. 2 On the basis of
work by Kuhn, Polanyi, and Collins, formal education and social-
ization into a research tradition or research institution seem to be
more important than knowledge of idealized or philosophical
formulations.33 Similarly, historical and empirical studies have been
unable to locate a simple set of institutional or personal commit-
ments or norms consistently adhered to by scientists. Norms
conventionally associated with the sciences, such as disinterestedness
and skepticism, are better understood as a complex moral language,
susceptible to strategic deployment, rather than as a guide to
scientific practice.' On examination, peer review and publication do
not appear to operate in the rigorously skeptical manner typically at-
tributed to them. Scientific journals, especially the most prestigious,
have many, sometimes competing, obligations among, for example,
rapid dissemination, maintaining broad interest, and providing the
most accurate information possible. Submissions are not always
thoroughly reviewed and are only rarely replicated. Perhaps it is not
surprising to find that in undertaking review, scientists tend to be
more sympathetic to individuals whose ideas and theories are
30. Many of the following characteristics are accepted by historians and sociologists with
realist sympathies. See, e.g., STEPHEN COLE, MAKING SCIENCE (1992); Pickstone, supra note
23.
31. For a more detailed account of post-Kuhnian approaches to expert evidence, see Gary
Edmond, Judicial Representations of Scientific Evidence, 63 MOD. L. REV. 216 (2000).
32. See, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 24; TREVOR PINCH, CONFRONTING NATURE: THE
SOCIOLOGY OF SOLAR-NEUTRINO DETECTION (1986); THE POLITICS AND RHETORIC OF
SCIENTIFIC METHOD (John Schuster & Richard Yeo eds., 1986). Notwithstanding a range of
empirical studies and philosophical and sociological critiques, many scientists (and non-
scientists) remain genuinely committed to highly abstract and often artificial images of sci-
entific practice and progress. It is perhaps not surprising to find that individuals and
institutions routinely relying upon the authority and credibility of scientific knowledge are
often reluctant to acknowledge or explore the more contingent, tacit, political, competitive,
and increasingly commercial dimensions of scientific organization and practice, or their
influence on the constitution of scientific knowledge. This is particularly true of those, like
judges, embroiled in public or professional controversies or science pedagogy.
33. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); MICHAEL
POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1958); COLLINS, supra note 24; see also Michael Mulkay
& Nigel Gilbert, Putting Philosophy to Work: Karl Popper's Influence on Scientific Practice,
11 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 389 (1981).
34. Ian Mitroff, Norms and Counter-Norms in a Select Group of the Apollo Moon
Scientists: A Case Study in the Ambivalence of Scientists, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 579 (1974);
Michael Mulkay, Interpretation and the Use of Rules: The Case of the Norms of Science, in
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 111 (T. Gieryn ed., 1980).
20021
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consonant with or reinforce their own.3" In addition, there have been
protracted difficulties surrounding attempts to locate and delimit
identifiable communities of scientists-of particular relevance for
admissibility decisions in legal settings-sharing assumptions and a
range of commitments on all but the most fundamental issues.36 The
boundaries used to distinguish between the sciences, and demarcate
scientific from non-scientific activity, seem more comprehensible
when understood as flexible and strategically manipulated.37 Perhaps
the final insult to traditional models is the contention that histor-
ically it is extremely difficult to locate an homogeneous entity or
pursuit that is easily characterized as Science.8 This is not to suggest
35. DARYL CHUBIN & EDWARD HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW AND U.S.
SCIENCE POLICY (1990); STEVE EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM AND THE
POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE AD-
VISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990); MARCEL LA FOLLETTE, STEALING INTO PRINT: FRAUD,
PLAGIARISM AND MISCONDUCT IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING (1992); Harry Collins, Tantalus
and the Aliens: Publications, Audiences and the Search for Gravitational Waves, 29 SOC.
STUD. SCI. 163 (1999); Gary Travis & Harry Collins, New Light on Old Boys." Cognitive and
Institutional Particularism in the Peer Review System, 16 SC. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 322
(1991). Contrast the legally oriented commentary by Elie Chan, The "Brave New World" of
Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
100 (1995).
36. Historically, notwithstanding the difficulty of ascertaining whether an assumption or
technique was accepted by a particular community of scientists, its apparent general ac-
ceptance was frequently embraced by judges as a means of resolving admissibility decisions.
The so-called general acceptance test, derived from the case of US. v. Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923), was criticized as being both excessively liberal and restrictive and was rhetorically
compromised in U.S. federal courts by the decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which determined that the Frye test did not, on its own,
survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. See Gary Edmond, Deflating
Daubert: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Inevitability of General Acceptance (Frye),
23 U.N.S.W. L.J. 38 (2000); Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COL. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
37. See THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE (Peter Galison ed., 1996); THOMAS GIERYN,
CULTURAL BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE (1998); KAREN KNORR-
CETINA, EPISTEMIC CULTURES: How THE SCIENCES MAKE KNOWLEDGE (1999); Karen
Knorr-Cetina, Scientific Communities of Transepistemic Arenas of Research? A Critique of
Quasi-Economic Models of Science, 12 SOC. STUD. SCI. 101 (1982).
38. A number of historians have emphasized the importance of adopting contextually
appropriate terminology to study the history of the sciences and technology. Indeed among
early modern historians there is a tendency to study natural philosophy, a more expansive set
of practices and metaphysical commitments-including a theological sensitivity-influencing
the production of knowledge about the natural world. See Cunningham & Williams, supra note
16; Andrew Cunningham, Getting the Game Right: Some Plain Words on the Identity and
Invention of Science, 19 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 365 (1988); Simon Schaffer, Natural
Philosophy, in THE FERMENT OF KNOWLEDGE: STUDIES IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SCIENCE 55 (G. Rousseau & R. Porter eds., 1980); John Schuster &
Graeme Watchirs, Natural Philosophy, Experiment and Discourse. Beyond the
Kuhn/Bachelard Problematic, in EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRIES 1 (Homer Le Grand ed., 1990);
John Schuster, The Scientific Revolution, in THE COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF MODERN
SCIENCE 217 (G. Cantor et al. eds., 1990). Other historians (and engineers) have questioned
traditional assumptions about the relationship between the sciences and technology. E.g.,
DONALD MACKENZIE, INVENTING ACCURACY: A HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF NUCLEAR
MISSILE GUIDANCE (1990); ANDREW WEBSTER, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY
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that historically there are no sciences, but to claim that they were not
homogeneous, universal, or susceptible to a description that resem-
bles the modern idea of Science. Instead there seems to be only an
assortment of often disparate activities-the sciences (plural)-that
are resistant to standardization through shared epistemologies,
attitudes, or commitments other than at the most abstract level.
Consequently, the sciences ought not to be conceived as a unified,
peculiarly rational pursuit. None of the foregoing should be
understood to imply that images of method, norms, or peer review
are irrelevant to the practice, pedagogy, and rhetoric of the sciences.
Rather they might be considered to be part of a flexible and
frequently contested repertoire.39 Indeed, this dimension converts
accounts endeavoring to delineate scientific progress into much more
complex and contextually attuned narratives, requiring additional
levels of analysis concerned with the discursive construction of the
Scientific and the Natural.
Assumptions about the existence and utility of attributes such as
methods, norms, and other institutional arrangements purporting to
guarantee the vitality and reliability of modern Science tend to dis-
courage detailed investigation of expert knowledge claims contested
in agonistic legal settings.' This is an unfortunate feature of much
contemporary legal historiography and commentary, because
litigation supplies circumstances in which attitudes to scientific
(un)reliability and some of its dominant social manifestations are-
somewhat inconsistently -strategically inscribed.' Because adversar-
ial legal forums and formal judgments endeavor to resolve disputes
in ways conceived as procedurally regular and epistemologically
robust, representations of practices and knowledges capable of being
characterized as cogent and persuasive -frequently equated with
reliability -assume considerable import. 2 This should not, however,
(1991); Edwin Layton, Mirror Image Twins: The Communities of Science and Technology in
19th-Century America, 12 TECH. & CULT. 562 (1971); Walter Vincenti, Technological
Knowledge Without Science: The Innovation of Flush Riveting in American Planes, ca. 1930-
ca. 1950,25 TECH. & CULT. 540 (1984).
39. NIGEL GILBERT & MICHAEL MULKAY, OPENING PANDORA'S Box: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF SCIENTISTS' DISCOURSE (1984); JONATHAN POTTER, REPRESENTING REALITY:
DISCOURSE, RHETORIC AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION (1996).
40. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical field, 38
HAST. L.J. 814 (1987); Pierre Bourdieu, The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social
Conditions of the Progress of Reason, 14 SOC. SC. INFO. 19 (1975).
41. Processes of inscription in other contexts are examined in INSCRIBING SCIENCE:
SCIENTIFIC TEXTS AND THE MATERIALITY OF COMMUNICATION (Timothy Lenoir ed., 1998);
TIMOTHY LENOIR, INSTITUTING SCIENCE: THE CULTURAL PRODUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC
DISCIPLINES (1997). See also STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR
PUMP: HOBBES, BOYLE AND THE EXPERIMENTAL LIFE (1985).
42. See BARRY BARNES, ABOUT SCIENCE 72-89 (1985); WYNNE, supra note 6.
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prevent the historian from inquiring into how images of reliability,
relevance, progress, or methodological and normative propriety are
actually contested and resolved during periods of controversy. 3
So, instead of attempting to define what Science is, I have
suggested that there is no such epistemologically predicated entity.
Rather, there are historically situated sciences, lacking universal or
essential attributes. Abandoning the commitment to predetermined,
highly artificial, and historically untenable attributes introduces
tremendous complexity into the attempt to understand scientific
controversy and its resolution. For example, rather than explain the
outcome of scientific disagreement on the basis of the use of the
appropriate method, the historian is empowered to question why and
how a particular method, experiment, or interpretation was strateg-
ically deployed, contested, and eventually accepted as (in)correct.
This complexity can be accentuated when superimposed upon
adversarial legal contexts that not only facilitate but encourage the
critical treatment of antagonistic knowledge claims.'
Together, the contextual response to whiggism, the symmetrical
approach to expert knowledges from the Strong Program in the soci-
ology of scientific knowledge, and the deployment of less idealized
models of the sciences operate to discourage the historian from
evaluating the evidence produced during the process of the litigation
on the basis of a correct value attributed at the close of proceedings.45
They should prevent the introduction of attitudes and preempt re-
course to values that were not available or were less certain at earlier
times, if they are to be employed as a yardstick against which to mea-
sure earlier performances. Symmetry enables the analyst to reflect
on how the reliability attributed to specific knowledge claims is
discursively produced, contested, and accepted in specific settings,
43. COLLINS, supra note 24, has argued that the closure of scientific controversy usually
reinforces, occasionally even codifies, what constitutes methodological propriety. Sociologists
who have studied expert disagreement in legal settings have provided some indication of the
manner in which judges and lawyers have influenced the development of forensic scientific
techniques such as the protocols surrounding the use of DNA typing evidence. See EXPERT
EVIDENCE, supra note 6; Contested Identities, supra note 6; Gary Edmond, The Law-Set: The
Legal-Scientific Production of Medical Propriety, 26 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 191 (2001).
Commentators such as Wynne have argued that controversy, like failed technological systems,
provides a means of access to normally "hidden" social and institutional processes. See Brian
Wynne, Unruly Technology Practical Rules, Impractical Discourses and Public Under-
standing, 18 SOC. STUD. SCI. 147 (1988).
44. This is not intended to diminish the importance of traditions, institutions, professional
commitments, or pervasive public beliefs. All of these aspects of knowledge and practice are,
potentially, available to assist with both the strategic representation as well as the interpret-
ation of expert knowledges.
45. Pickstone, supra note 23. This tendency may be of less consequence in short and more
isolated proceedings. But even in these settings the meanings attributed to the evidentiary rec-
ord are frequently dialectical, unfolding across the litigation. See BUTTERFIELD, supra note 4.
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without diminishing the contextual use and influence of factors such
as procedural rules, professional and institutional commitments, or
resource implications. Symmetry and contextualism both privilege
process and encourage commentators to explain how some
knowledges and images of proper practice become authoritative or
hegemonic.
As will be illustrated below, failure to adopt a more contextually
and temporally sensitive symmetrical approach prevents the histor-
ian from accounting for a whole realm of nuances and debates a-
round the meaning of expert knowledges and practices and their role
in the maintenance of social order. In addition, failure to use such a
symmetrical approach seems to render some of the highly sophis-
ticated forensic techniques and rules employed by lawyers, judges,
and scientists as perverse or irrational. To some extent this may
appear curious: notwithstanding that commentators tend to attribute
a proper value to purportedly clear and convincing scientific records
that are eventually understood to constitute reliable evidence, a
sizeable proportion of the litigation to be examined required decades
to conclude.
Historians and legal commentators who assess performances on
the basis of retrospective values, and even to some extent extra-legal
practices, can avoid overlooking the dynamic features of adversarial
litigation and the contingency of not only law and legal procedure
but scientific and expert knowledges. To accomplish this, they should
consider approaching scientific and expert disagreement on the as-
sumption that experts, lawyers, and the parties are actively engaged
in attempts to construct and represent knowledge in order to
persuade -deliberately diminishing the value of some types of know-
ledge and expertise while simultaneously reinforcing or privileging
others.' Adopting a more historically nuanced approach to expert
knowledges examining their integration into legally conditioned nar-
ratives, and remaining sensitive to opposing cases, legal institutions,
and constraints, shifts the analysis from a search for the most reliable
knowledge and its earliest articulation in order to criticize individual
46. See Contested Identities, supra note 6, at 865; Gary Edmond, Azaria's Accessories:
The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of Guilt and Innocence, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 396
(1998); Steven Fuchs & Stephen Ward, What Is Deconstruction, and Where and When Does It
Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law, 59 AM. SOc. REV. 481 (1994).
The strategic representations reflect the use of contingent and empiricist (or constitutive)
repertoires described by GILBERT & MULKAY, supra note 39, at 56-57; HARRY COLLINS &
TREVOR PINCH, FRAMES OF MEANING 188 (1982).
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and institutional performances47 to an examination of the processes
involved in strategic productions, interaction and contestation.4"
The following examples have been drawn from the writings of
historians, legal academics, and judges in order to demonstrate the
broad utility of the methodological tools. Though not randomly sel-
ected, the examples do, nevertheless, exemplify a range of responses
to scientific evidence that, on the basis of my own work and the work
of others cited throughout the Article, appear to be ubiquitous.
These diverse examples illuminate theoretical limitations to the
study of expert evidence in legal settings that occur in multiple juris-
dictions, different types of litigation, and various time periods. The
first of the studies examines medical evidence in a Victorian England
sodomy trial. The second explores the last two appeals in the British
case of the Birmingham Six. Finally, the third describes a recent
series of trials and appeals associated with birth defects allegedly
caused by a pharmaceutical product in the United States. Each of the
studies examines a relatively detailed account of its subject; far more
sophisticated than news-media and popular versions. Despite this,
each will be shown to suffer from historiographical defects with
serious implications for our understanding of the specific encounters
and the more general issues of the operation of legal systems and the
possibility of law reform predicated upon historical analysis.
II. MEDICAL DISAGREEMENT IN A
NINETEENTH-CENTURY SODOMY TRIAL
The first example examines the uses of expert medical evidence in
the historiography of the arraignment and trial of Ernest Boulton
and Frederick Park in 1870-71. Focusing upon a recent paper by
Charles Upchurch," it is intended to demonstrate that simplistic or
uncritical conceptualizations of expert evidence cannot capture the
complex, situated negotiations and contests over medical knowledge
47. This amounts to a version of the whig quest for oigins. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 4, at
43.
48. Several criminologists and legal theorists have explored the construction of criminality,
particularly conviction, but they have focused their attention on the role of expert evidence in
prosecuting rarely and in the process of exoneration very rarely. See, e.g., PAT CARLEN,
MAGISTRATES' JUSTICE (1976); DOREEN MCBARNETT, CONVICTION: LAW, THE STATE AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (1983); MIKE MCCONVILLE, ANDREW SANDERS & RICHARD
LENG, THE CASE FOR THE PROSECUTION: POLICE SUSPECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
CRIMINALITY (1991).
49. BENT FLYBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE MATTER 66-87 (2001) (discussing the
benefits of selective case studies and the difficulties inherent in attempts to identify represen-
tative examples).
50. Charles Upchurch, Forgetting the Unthinkable. Cross-Dressers and Bitish Society in
the Case ofThe Queen vs. Boulton and Others, 12 GEND. & HIST. 127 (2000).
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and propriety unfolding during the course of adversarial litigation.
This discussion will show that an inability to appreciate the processes
involved in the strategic articulation of legal rules and standards as
well as contests over the meaning of evidence can produce
tendentious interpretations.' Upchurch's account of the litigation is
particularly illuminating because he devotes, quite deliberately, little
attention to the medical evidence, institutional traditions, and rules
of practice and proof. Together, assumptions about the medical
evidence and strategic decisions in relation to the conduct of the
prosecution and defense lead Upchurch to postulate a conspiracy
among the Crown, defense, and judges, to conceal the extent of
cross-dressing and sodomy in Victorian England. As we shall see,
that perspective is seriously compromised by combining knowledge
of contemporary Victorian legal practice with a more diachronic
assessment of the development of the expert opinion evidence
presented during the trial.
In April 1870 Earnest Boulton and Frederick Park were arrested
in drag. Having been under police surveillance for more than a year,
they were finally arrested after entering a women's dressing room-a
public indecency offense-at the Lyceum Theatre in London.
Boulton and Park were detained in police custody, where they were
examined by police surgeon Dr. Paul, ostensibly to ascertain their
sex. Paul, whose interest and suspicions seem to have been aroused,
extended the scope of his medical examination to include the anus-
es." Later, in his testimony, Paul described the defendants' penises as
elongated and anuses as the most dilated he had ever encountered.
The prisoners and a number of associates were sent to trial for
buggery and conspiracy to commit buggery, in addition to the
original public disorder offense. The bases for these charges were
Paul's medical assessment and a range of other supposedly in-
criminating evidence, 3 including a considerable body of apparently
51. This discussion is adapted from a more detailed account: Gary Edmond, The
Importance of Being Ignorant: Interpreting Strategy, Legal Procedure and Medical Evidence
in the Arraignment and Trial of R v. Boulton and Park and Others (1871) (2001)
(unpublished).
52. Harvey Sacks, Notes on Police Assessment of Moral Character, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL
INTERACTION 280 (David Sudnow ed., 1972). Paul explained his curiousity on the basis of
exposure to Professor Alfred Taylor's MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1861).
53. In the historiography of Boulton and Park, most historians accept, some without
explanation, that notwithstanding the eventual not guilty verdict, the accused were obviously
sodomites. This assumption raises questions about the meaning of the contemporary
behaviours, circumstantial evidence, and the ability of historians and various Victorian publics
to sensitively interpret them. See, e.g., Upchurch, supra note 50, at 137, 140. See also ROGER
BAKER, DRAG: A HISTORY OF FEMALE IMPERSONATION IN THE PERFORMING ARTS 147-51
(1994); ROGER BAKER, DRAG: A HISTORY OF FEMALE IMPERSONATION ON THE STAGE 122-
27 (1968); NEIL BARTLETT, WHO WAS THAT MAN? A PRESENT FOR MR. OSCAR WILDE 128-
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intimate letters between Boulton and Park and others, some of
which implied they were married to men, and the evidence of cross-
dressing and associated antics including the sharing of beds.
Figure 1: Boulton and Park being led from Bow Street PoliceStation, 1870."4
Anticipating that the trial would be sensational, like the arraign-
ment, the Attorney-General was persuaded to undertake the pro-
secution in person. Before the trial he invoked his prerogative and
dismissed the buggery charge on the basis of insufficient evidence.
Instead, the accused were confronted with a charge of conspiracy to
commit buggery among themselves and with others. The charge of
49 (1988); VERN BULLOUGH & BONNIE BULLOUGH, CROSS DRESSING, SEX ANDGENDER
189-91 (1993); WILLIAM COHEN, SEX SCANDAL: THE PRIVATE PART OF VICTORIAN FICTION
129-73 (1996); H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, THE OTHER LOVE: AN HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY SURVEY OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN BRITAIN 94-98 (1970); CYRIL PEARL,
VICTORIAN PATCHWORK 105-20 (1972); RONALD PEARSALL, THE WORM IN THE BUD: THE
WORLD OF VICTORIAN SEXUALITY 459-66 (1969); WILLIAM ROUGHEAD, BAD COMPANIONS
149-83 (1930); ALAN SINFIELD, THE WILDE CENTURY: EFFEMINACY, OSCAR WILDE AND THE
QUEER MOVEMENT 6-8 (1994); JEFFREY WEEKS, AGAINST NATURE: ESSAYS ON HISTORY,
SEXUALITY AND IDENTITY 46-47, 49-50 (1991); JEFFREY WEEKS, COMING OUT:
HOMOSEXUAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN, FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 14-
15, 37 (1977); Neil Bartlett, Evidence: 1870, in RECLAIMING SODOM 288-99 (J. Goldberg ed.,
1994); Jim Davis, Androgynous Cliques and Epicene Colleges.- Gender Transgression on and
off the Victorian Stage, 26 NINETEENTH CENTURY THEATRE 50 (1998).
54. Originally published in the May, 20, 1871 issue of The Day's Doings, a weekly London
news magazine.
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conspiracy may have been more difficult to prosecute, but it was
correspondingly more difficult to defend. During the trial the
meaning of the medical evidence, the correspondence, and cross-
dressing were actively contested. In a complicated exercise in social
hermeneutics-there were few popular registers linking cross-dres-
sing to sodomy-the Crown endeavored to link Paul's medical
opinion about the condition of the anuses to the other circumstantial
evidence to encourage a particular apprehension of its meaning.
In response, eminent and highly competent defense lawyers en-
deavored to weaken the Crown's links among the correspondence,
cross-dressing, and sodomy. Drawing upon the defendants' keen in-
terest in amateur theatricals enabled lawyers to provide an innocent
explanation for the many dresses and accessories as well as a means
to explain the perpetuation of roles (such as those of husband and
wife) from the stage into familiar correspondence.55 In addition, the
defense called four surgeons to contest Paul's opinion and the at-
tempt by the Crown to establish a link between the circumstantial
evidence and the allegedly more objective opinions of its medical
witnesses.
In his account of the case, Upchurch contends that the prosecution
eventually failed because the Attorney-General and the defense con-
spired (notwithstanding the absence of written records) in order to
contain knowledge of the extent of cross-dressing and sodomy in
London, to protect both middle-class women and Britain's inter-
national reputation. Commenting briefly though significantly on the
medical opinions, Upchurch is critical of the Attorney-General for
not preparing more incriminating medical evidence. This is impor-
tant because the Crown acknowledged toward the close of the trial
that it could no longer expect a jury to rely upon the incriminating
medical evidence of Dr. Paul. So for Upchurch, and some others, the
Crown's medical evidence was inadequate, evidently before the trial
commenced. Otherwise, criticism of the Attorney-General would be
unfounded. Upchurch equates the evidence as it was understood
toward the end of the trial with pre-trial perspectives and implies
that any apparent, contemporaneous differences should be explained
on the basis of a conspiracy among the legal protagonists. In other
words, the Attorney-General was cognizant of the weaknesses in the
55. A number of social historians have examined connections between cross-dressing,
same-sex relations, and the stage. See NETrA MURRAY GOLDSMITH, THE WORST OF CRIMES:
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LONDON 1-28 (1998); Lenard
Berlanstein, Breeches and Breaches." Cross-Dress Theatre and the Culture of Gender
Ambiguity in Modern France, 38 COMP. STUD. Soc. & HIST. 338 (1996); Davis, supra note 53,
at 58-63; Lawrence Senelick, Mollies or Men of Mode? Sodomy and the Eighteenth-Century
London Stage, 1 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 33 (1990).
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Crown's medical evidence and made no serious attempt to augment
it and thereby strengthen the prosecution's case.
If, however, the meaning of the medical opinion evidence can be
shown to be, to a considerable degree, developed across the proceed-
ings diachronically, as skillful Crown and defence barristers and sur-
geons strategically contested its meaning in relation to the other evi-
dence, procedural constraints, and their own professional identities,
then rather than ascribing bad faith or conspiracy to the Attorney-
General and several others, we might obtain some insight into how
the knowledge claims were developed and some were privileged. We
might also want to examine some of the processes involved in the
selection, presentation, emphasis, comparison, and simplification of
the various expert opinions. Upchurch's account oversimplifies the
dynamic and localized semantic contest surrounding the expert
evidence, particularly the strategic production of medical propriety
and reliable knowledge. A few examples will help to illustrate how
the status of Paul's evidence was transformed from convincing to
unreliable during the course of the proceedings, in a manner that
tends to compromise Upchurch's conspiracy theory.
The following examples, extracted from a far more complex series
of interactions, illustrate how the defense narrative was strengthened
through strategic representations of medical evidence and practice.56
It is not my intention to privilege or make a priori assumptions about
the relative value of the evidence on the basis of the subsequent
Crown concessions, but rather to attempt the more fundamental task
of explaining how those conditions were brought about.
Paul's description of the defendants' anuses has already been
recounted. Before the trial Paul's opinions were effectively black-
boxed.57 It was not until he was cross-examined that the basis of his
56. Although they are arguably not strictly relevant to the extent and significance of anal
dilation, the meanings of cicatrix from previous operations, the presence of anal warts, and
Park's possible scarring from syphilis of the anus were strategically contested in relation to
Paul's performance and the conclusions of the other surgeons. Similar assumptions and
debates persist in contemporary jurisprudence, particularly in relation to the alleged sexual
assault of children. See R v. J-LJ [2000] S.C.R. 51 (Canadian Supreme Court case); IAN
HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 148-51 (1999) (discussing the Cleveland
affair).
57. Richard Whitley, Black Boxism and the Sociology of Science: A Discussion of the
Major Developments in the Field, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 61 (P. Halmos ed., 1972).
There was some preliminary cross-examination of Dr. Paul at the arraignment, but the
presiding magistrate (Flowers), like Chief Justice Cockburn at the trial, thought that there was
sufficient evidence to warrant proceeding with the prosecution. Both of these judges suggested
that Paul's medical evidence was admissible. In the Daily Telegraph, the following deter-
mination was attributed to Flowers:
"My mind is made up. I hope I have not listened with any prejudice; I hope from
the first my mind has been open; but I think on the evidence before me my duty is
to send the matter for trial upon the graver charge and upon the misdemeanour
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conduct and the propriety of his examination was strategically
exposed (deconstructed), and developed in ways that were designed
to make his earlier performance appear inadequate, especially when
contrasted with the (known) performances of the more experienced
and eminent surgeons. During cross-examination Paul conceded that
he had examined the prisoners in a small, poorly lit room, behind a
screen, for a period of one to three minutes each." It was also made
apparent that in extending his examinations beyond the genitalia,
Paul had transcended his legal entitlement. It was no coincidence
that the defence sought to ascertain from the other surgeons, par-
ticularly the other Crown witnesses, in what circumstances and for
how long they had undertaken their examinations. Clark, Hughes,
Johnston, and Harvey (for the defense) and Barwell, Gibson, and
Taylor (for the Crown) had all conducted more leisurely and legally
sanctioned medical examinations ranging from fifteen minutes to an
hour while the prisoners were in custody awaiting trial.
In addition to the duration, the defense lawyers strategically differ-
entiated the equipment produced by the other surgeons. At the trial,
the defense emphasized their possession of a powerful magnifying
glass and a speculum of the rectum and contrasted them to Paul's use
of his naked eyes and hands. The contest over the adequacy and
meaning of Paul's examination was intimately related, by the
defense, to an image of the ideal or proper examination, in order to
restrict what could be seen and consequently the conclusions that
could be legitimately drawn. 9 Representations of the ideal examina-
tion combined extra-legal images with the opinions and perfor-
mances of the other medical experts involved in the proceedings.
Medical propriety and the nature of reality were simultaneously at
stake -significantly, they were being negotiated in the courtroom
afterthe surgeons had undertaken their examinations.'
also, and that I must do that without bail." The Boulton and Park Prosecution,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 31, 1870, at 5.
See also The Boulton and Park Prosecution, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 12, 1871, at 6, for the
comments attributed to Chief Justice Cockburn.
58. During re-examination, the Attorney-General endeavored to suggest that regardless of
a range of apparent limitations to Paul's performance, the brief examination was sufficient to
observe severe dilation.
59. See Lorraine Daston & Peter Gallison, The Image of Objectivity, 40 REPRESEN-
TATIONS 81 (1992); Charles Goodwin, Professional Vision, 96 AM. ANTHROPOLOGY 606
(1994); Charles Goodwin, Seeing in Depth, 25 SOC. STUD. So. 237 (1995).
60. It is not my intention to suggest that courtroom contests are insulated from medical
traditions and standards of practice, but rather to place emphasis on the circumstances
attending litigation that tend to encourage and facilitate the strategic emphasis on differences
and highly purposive representations of complex evidentiary matrices suited to the purposes of
the case and sensitive to rules and traditions surrounding evidence and procedure. These
considerations are irreducible to the conditions surrounding extra-legal scientific and medical
controversies and on occasion even extra-legal. standards or protocols. Perhaps a good example
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The only surgeon, apart from Paul, to publicly acknowledge
familiarity with a dilated anus was the Crown's witness, Professor
Taylor. Thirty-eight years earlier Taylor had encountered what he
identified as a cross-dressing sodomite, "Eliza" Edwards, during a
routine, and therefore institutionally and professionally sanitized,
autopsy. This encounter, in conjunction with his testimony indicating
that there was nothing abnormal about the appearances of Boulton
and Park, led the defense to endeavor to portray Taylor as not only
the most authoritative expert witness but also the most experienced.
In order to amplify these distinctions, the defense adverted to the
fact that Paul had attended Taylor's lectures and deferred to Taylor's
authority on forensic medicine. This enabled another strategic
contrast in which the opinion of the eminent professor and author
could be juxtaposed with that of his more modestly positioned
student.6'
In addition to the account of "Eliza" recorded in Taylor's celebra-
ted text, a range of French and German publications were discussed
during the course of proceedings. At the trial Paul and Gibson were
in possession of medical works on sodomy from the Continent. None
of the surgeons who testified professed much interest in the subject
or prior interest in the Continental or local literature.62 The general
English medical, legal, and social disdain enabled the defense to
suggest Paul's possession of such works reflected an inappropriate
interest in the subject. None of the foreign texts was admitted as
evidence. The defense lawyers and Chief Justice Cockburn stressed
the difficulty of testing or ascertaining the credibility of these foreign
works and authorities in their construction of a preference for oral
evidence in English law. As with his conduct of the examinations,
Paul's possession of a work of questionable authority by Tardieu63
could be portrayed as suspicious. In this context, where the posses-
sion of texts or even interest in some types of knowledge was vulner-
able to aspersion, medical ignorance could be portrayed as a virtue.
One interesting feature of the trial was that in the absence of
extensive experience, all of the surgeons were willing and able, some
in very confident terms, to provide testimony on the basis of
is the Australian High Court's response to expert medical opinion evidence in medical
negligence litigation, Rogers v. Whittacker (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479. In Rogers the High Court
explained that judges rather than doctors would determine whether specific actions and
practices constituted medical negligence. See also Rosenberg v. Percival (2001) 75 A.L.J.R.
734.
61. See TAYLOR, supra note 52.
62. E.g., WILLIAM ACTON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON DISEASES OF THE URINARY AND
GENERATIVE ORGANS (IN BOTH SEXES) (2d ed. 1851).
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extrapolation from their more regular physiological knowledge.
Ignorance and uncertainty were being actively negotiated in a
context acutely sensitive to (reasonable) doubt. '
Upchurch's conspiracy theory is also weakened by a lack of
attention to legal strategy, rules, and procedures. Indeed the alleged
conspiracy might be more directly dismissed by interpreting the
Attorney-General's trial strategy as defensible under the circum-
stances. For instance, Upchurch is highly critical of the Attorney-
General for not calling some of the cross-dressing witnesses who
appeared at the arraignment to testify at the trial. But this oversim-
plifies the proceedings. An arraignment is not a trial. There were
different lawyers, judges, and charges at the arraignment, and the
testimony of the cross-dressing witnesses appears to have been con-
ceived as possibly prejudicial to the Crown case. Arguing that cross-
dressing was widespread offered few advantages to the Crown if it
could not be directly equated with sodomy. Acknowledging the
prevalence of cross-dressing may have made the asserted relation-
ship with sodomy appear less plausible. In turn, it might have
compromised the defense's contention that the defendants' cross-
dressing was generally associated with dramatic performances and
only very occasionally manifested in what were characterized as pub-
lic frolics and larks. A degree of convergence between the interests
of the Crown and defense, as neither had much incentive to
acknowledge the existence of a cross-dressing fraternity, and a
restricted presentation of the evidence might be explained on the
basis of the adversarial system requiring the parties to adduce their
own evidence, in combination with a mutual desire to minimize the
publicity associated with the prosecution. These convergences may
have been accentuated by the concerns of the defendants' families,
particularly Park's father who, as a senior English judge, presumably
financed and may have influenced the conduct of the defense.
In addition, the decision to prosecute for conspiracy is potentially
subversive to the analysis by Upchurch. Appropriately, Upchurch
explains that the Attorney-General's decision to dismiss the charge
(nolle prosequi) of sodomy thereby made "the 1871 case hinge on
issues of conspiracy to commit sodomy, rather than sodomy itself."65
However, in this context it is important to recognize that proving a
charge of sodomy required direct evidence. Even uncontested
64. See BARBARA SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991); Charles
Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences. The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1187 (1979); Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1955 (1995).
65. Upchurch, supra note 50, at 144.
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medical evidence may have been insufficient to sustain the charge. It
is possible that the Crown case for conspiracy may have been the
strongest case that could be assembled against the defendants (and
may have been stronger without medical evidence). Upchurch's
analysis overlooks the possibility that an allegation of sodomy was
probably easier to defend than an accusation of conspiracy, so the
Attorney-General's decision to drop the charge may have actually
strengthened the Crown's position relative to the defense.6
Although not primarily oriented toward legal strategy or the
medical evidence, the account by Upchurch exploits several
simplified images to its advantage. His account ascribes a particular
value to the medical evidence of Paul and his critics (Clark, Hughes,
Johnston, Harvey, and variously Taylor and Gibson).
Notwithstanding its simplicity, the value accorded to the medical
evidence infuses it with explanatory purchase, as a purportedly
stable post-trial value is transported to the pre-trial situation in order
to make sense of the Attorney-General's decisions, which appear
disingenuous and serve to fuel the conspiracy theory.
If, in contrast, the meaning of Paul's opinion and the propriety of
his conduct was not fully pre-determined or reducible to clear and
incontrovertible meanings among the surgeons (or lawyers) before
the unfolding of the trial, then the version of the litigation provided
by Upchurch is seriously flawed on the basis that the processes
involved in the production of meaning are not considered. Before his
cross-examination, Paul's observations might have been considered
to have been sufficiently reliable to support the Crown's case.
Explanation of how and why particular images and practices are
presented and preferred and how some opinions are
epistemologically compromised or effaced is absent. That approach
elides the contingency linking professional, institutional, and social
alignments, media reporting and related concerns about public
66. See VERN BULLOUGH, HOMOSEXUALITY: A HISTORY 31-45 (1979); COHEN, supra
note 53, at 85; GOLDSMITH, supra note 55, at 31-48. Prior to the enactment of the Offences
Against the Person Act, 1828, 9 Geo. 5, ch. 31, conviction required proof of both penetration
and emission. The Act, designed to reduce the onerous burden of proof, required "proof of
penetration only," § 18. See The King v. Wiseman, 92 Eng. Rep. 774 (1718); Rex v. Robert
Reekspear, 168 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1832); Rex v. Cozins, 172 Eng. Rep. 1272 (1834); Arthur
Gilbert, Buggery and the British Navy 1700-1861, 10 J. SOC. HIST. 72 (1976); A.D. Harvey,
Prosecutions for Sodomy in England at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century, 21 HIST. J.
939, 941 (1978). It should be acknowledged that the decision to use the charge of conspiracy
was criticized by the defence barristers, and eventually the Chief Justice. See Law Report,
TIMES, May 16, 1871, at 11; The Boulton and Park Prosecution, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 16,
1871, at 3. Notwithstanding that criticism, neither Flowers (presiding at the arraignment) nor
Chief Justice Cockburn (at the trial) were willing to grant bail or dismiss the prosecution. The
decision to proceed in the attempt to prosecute the more difficult-to-prove charge of con-
spiracy may have also been a consequence of the difficulty in dropping a politically sensitive
case. See The Young Men in Women's Clothes, TIMES, May 16, 1870, at 9.
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interest, and epistemological relations to the performances of
eminent surgeons, barristers, and judges (and jury). Instead of
conspiracy or the attribution of a proper value to the evidence, a
more diachronically nuanced and symmetrical assessment of the
contest surrounding the medical evidence may help to transform our
understanding of the case, particularly the interpretation of the
actions of not only the Attorney-General, but the various judges, the
lawyers and surgeons (especially Paul) involved throughout the
proceedings, and the strategies they employed to prosecute and
defend the case, their professions and themselves.
III. CHANGING ASSESSMENTS OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
THE CASE OF THE BIRMINGHAM SIX
Readers will presumably be more familiar with the two remaining
examples, though perhaps in alternative forms to the narrative
possibilities suggested in this Article. Both cases feature more recent
and more protracted contests over the reliability and legal instan-
tiation of expert evidence and, based on the perspectives presented
in almost the entire range of popular, media, scholarly, and judicial
accounts, provide fairly robust targets for methodological reflection.
The Birmingham Six were a group of Irish men convicted of
bombing two Birmingham pubs in 1974. The prosecution case
consisted of three basic evidentiary dimensions: (1) confessions, (2)
scientific evidence that two of the six had been handling nitrogly-
cerine, and (3) other circumstantial evidence. After their conviction
in 1975, the Six were refused leave to appeal.67 It was not until a 1987
television documentary publicly challenged some of the tests used by
a forensic scientist involved in the investigation and trial that the
case was referred by the Home Secretary to the Court of Appeal." In
dismissing that appeal the Court concluded, somewhat infamously,
that "the longer this case has gone on, the more this court has been
convinced that the jury were correct."'6 In 1990 the case was again
referred to the Court, this time on the basis of apparent irregularities
in the records of confessions. On this later occasion the convictions
were quashed and the appellants released. The following discussion
will draw upon some aspects of the judicial reversal and subsequent
67. Leave for appeal was denied in 1976 by the then Chief Justice, Lord Widgery.
68. Hugh Callahan, Patrick Hill, Robert Gerard Hunter, Richard Mcllkenny, William
Power & John Walker, 88 Crim. App. R. 40, 44 (C.A. 1989) [hereinafter Callahan & Others].
69. Callahan & Others, 88 Crim. App. R. at 47. The Court in 1987, like Lord Denning
commenting on the civil action in 1980, had little idea what would happen in 1991.
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academic assessment of the scientific evidence in what is now
generally accepted as a notorious miscarriage of justice."
A. Judicial Representations of the Scientific Evidence
Being a judge requires institutional commitment and the use of
tacit skills which often constrain actions and pronouncements.71
When judges try or review cases they are invariably involved in some
type of historical exercise, but their attentions are rarely directed
exclusively to historiographical subtleties as they are simultaneously
concerned with rules, procedures, evidence and rights, limited
resources, implications which may flow from any decision as well as
maintaining the socio-political legitimacy of the legal system.'
Judges, therefore, have different concerns and constituencies from
historians but are frequently engaged in an historical enterprise,
trying to make sense of the past on the basis of an imperfect
evidentiary record and through institutions and procedures that
often restrict the ways in which evidence, and even what can count as
evidence, can be accessed.73
70. This account of the Birmingham Six is adapted from a more detailed discussion of the
uses of scientific evidence in miscarriages of justice. See Gary Edmond, Mi'sunderstanding the
Uses of Scientific Evidence in High Profile Criminal Appeals: The Social Construction of
Miscarriages of Justice, 22 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 53 (2002).
71. See MALCOLM FEELEY & E. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 204-52 (1999); STANLEY FISH,
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989); MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1958);
Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J.
LEG. EDUC. 518 (1986).
72. The use of historical evidence, particularly in the realm of constitutional interpretation,
has spawned a considerable literature. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, History Lean: The
Reconciliation of Private Property and Representative Government, 95 COL. L. REV. 591
(1995); Martin Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COL. L
REV. 523 (1995); William Forbath, Hendrik Hartog & Martha Minnow, Introduction.- Legal
Histories from Below, WIsc. L. REV. 759 (1985); Peter Hoffer, Blind to History, 23 RUTGERS
L.J. 271 (1992); N. Hull & Peter Hoffer, Historians and the Impeachment Imbroglio: In Search
of a Serviceable History, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 473 (2000); Peter Irons, C'o on the Stand The
Promise and Perils of l-'stoical Review, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 337 (1988); Alfred Kelly, Clio
and the Court. An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119; Buckner Melton, Clio at the
Bar. A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REv. 377 (1998);
Wendie Schneider, Note, Past Imperfect, 110 YALE L.J. 1531 (2001); Suzanna Sherry, The In-
determinacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 437 (1995); Cass Sunstein,
The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COL. L. REv. 601 (1995); William Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The
United States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 (1988).
73. Indigeneous land claims and heritage protection litigation provide instructive examples
of such difficulties. Judges are often required to hear and evaluate various types of aboriginal,
anthropological, historical, documentary, archaeological, linguistic, and geneaological evi-
dence. For some indication of the difficulties, consider the Canadian case of Delgamuukw v.
The Queen, [1991] D.L.R. 185, Delgamuukw v. B. C., [1997] S.C.R. 1010, and the Australian
case of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria, (1998) F.C.A. 1606, (2001) F.C.A. 45. See
also Michael Asch & Catherine Bell, Definition and Interpretation of Fact in Canadian Abor-
iginal Title Litigation: An Analysis ofDelgamuukw, 19 QUEEN'S L.J. 503 (1993).
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The case of the Birmingham Six provides an instructive example of
some of the techniques employed by judges to rationalize decision-
making where they are confronted with an extensive evidentiary
record developed over a considerable period of time. Focusing on
the final two appeals affords an opportunity to examine how two
senior appellate courts came to very different conclusions, one
dismissing and one upholding the appeal. The following discussion
examines differences between the representation of scientific
evidence in the two appellate judgments. The tremendous publicity
generated by the campaign to free the Birmingham Six and serious
concerns with sections of the criminal justice system, including the
Court of Criminal Appeal, might provide some degree of social
explanation for the changing legal and evidentiary perspectives
though, perhaps not surprisingly, such considerations are largely
absent from the purportedly evidence-based and technical legal
rationalizations produced by judges.74
Notwithstanding allegations of forced confessions and police
brutality, the earliest sustained public response to the convictions
was directed toward the scientific tests undertaken by the Home Of-
fice forensic scientist, Dr. Skuse. During the trial Skuse had testified
that, on the basis of his results from a Griess test, two of the
defendants' hands had tested positive for nitroglycerine (NG). Later,
another forensic scientist, Dr. Drayton, using the far more sensitive
gas chromatography/mass spectroscopy (GC/MS) technique, con-
firmed Skuse's findings for one of the samples. This second result led
Skuse to increase his confidence in the presence of NG from 99 to
100 percent.
Doubt surrounding the specificity of Skuse's Griess tests was
resolved by the Court during the 1987 appeal, on the basis that even
if the tests were not specific for NG, they had identified some
substance, and the possibility that it was NG was strongly supported
by the result of the (approximately 1,000 times) more sensitive
GCMS technique. Perhaps not surprisingly, during that appeal the
appellants' counsel also challenged Drayton's GC/MS result.
74. Accepting that the preferred outcome may drive or even occasionally determine the
reasoning and what constitutes relevant and reliable evidence, the evidence and the rules and
their sui generis interactions with the production and assessment of evidence should not be
overlooked. Approaching the evidence, procedure, rules, and traditions as well as the
preferred outcome without pre-determined commitments may enable the construction of
plausible explanations that provide some indication of the nature of the legal-judicial closure
of controversy and the strategic use of expert evidence. In the case of the Birmingham Six,
there was protracted and highly critical media coverage of the Court of Appeal and individual
judges, which led the Chief Justice to resign prematurely, politicians to re-refer the case to the
Court of Appeal, and public inquiries that all eventually resulted in the reform of criminal
justice institutions and practices.
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Accepting that Drayton's positive GC/MS result was expressed
differently in a variety of contexts-her initial finding of "possible ng
present" in the sample was used collaboratively, with Skuse's then
reliable evidence, at the trial-when Skuse's testimony and
techniques were impugned the GC/MS result assumed center-stage.75
This remained as some type of corroborative interpretation although
the balance between the findings of Skuse and Drayton was now
reversed. During the 1987 appeal, scientists for the defense produced
a number of possible explanations for Drayton's "positive" GC/MS
result that were not consistent with the presence of NG. These
suggestions were rejected by Drayton and subsequently by the Court
of Appeal as not worthy of "sensible rational consideration. 6
Upholding the convictions, the Court concluded that "the presence
of nitroglycerine on Hill's left hand, for which there could be no
innocent explanation, was proved beyond reasonable doubt." 77
The interpretation of the NG evidence was quite different in the
changing social and evidentiary circumstances leading to the second
appeal in 1991. The circumstances were different, not because there
were profoundly new perspectives on the explosives evidence, but as
we shall see, many of the previously dismissed concerns were
resurrected in the later appeal. What counts as newor fresh evidence
can be invested with considerable legal import." The major differ-
ences between the appeals concerned the concurrent investigation by
Justice May (the May Inquiry)' into other contemporaneous terror-
ist convictions which raised serious doubts over the reliability of
some of the scientific evidence; evidence suggesting serious anoma-
75. For an indication of the changing status, or tractability, of knowledge across contexts,
consider JEROME RAVETZ, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS PROBLEMS (1971). For a study
of reification of scientific "knowledge," see BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR,
LABORATORY LIFE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1979).
76. Richard Mcllkenny, Patrick Hill, William Power, John Walker, Robert Gerard Hunter
& Hugh Callaghan, 93 Crim. App. R. 287, 302 (C.A. 1991) [hereinafter Mclkenny& Others].
77. Id. Some of these extracts pertaining to the 1987 appeal are taken from the 1991
judgement. Despite widespread commitment to the existence of an accountable and publicly
accessible criminal justice system, the trial and first appeal were not fully reported on the
public record.
78. These classifications do not always reflect a literal chronology as much as a chronology
of judicial appropriation and use. Despite their description as entirely new or fresh, that
characterization is frequently a consequence of a novel use in judicial rationalizations. It is
here that, despite the legal system's purported commitment to openness and access, trials and
the majority of judicial rationalizations routinely benefit from the restricted number of readers
and a general commitment, among legal commentators and in media reports, to idealized
images of the sciences.
79. SIR JOHN MAY, INTERIM REPORT ON THE MAGUIRE CASE (1990) [hereinafter MAY,
INTERIM REPORT]. SIR JOHN MAY, FINAL REPORT: RETURN TO AN ADDRESS OF THE
HONOURABLE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DATED 30 JUNE 1994, FOR A REPORT INTO THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CONVICTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE BOMB ATTACKS IN
GUILDFORD AND WOOLWICH IN 1974 (1994) [hereinafter MAY, FINAL REPORT].
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lies in the police record and description of confessions that the Six
had always insisted were forced or fabricated; and even greater
media, political, and popular concern at what was now widely accep-
ted as a serious miscarriage of justice.
The case of the Birmingham Six was referred to the Court of Ap-
peal, for a second time, ostensibly on the basis of the results of
document analysis (ESDA) of the records of confession. In short, it
was alleged that investigating police had fabricated the confessions
and/or used brutality to extract them. Specialist examination of the
confessions revealed a number of discrepancies between some of the
documents central to the prosecution and statements from police
about the circumstances of their production. This evidence was
extremely important for three reasons. First, the defendants had
steadfastly maintained that they were beaten and forced to confess,
having unsuccessfully and controversially attempted to recover
damages for some of their injuries through civil action against police
and prison warders while in prison. Second, because the police and
judges had simply dismissed these allegations-during one appeal
Lord Denning had declared, "This is such an appalling vista that
every sensible person in the land would say: 'It cannot be right that
these actions should go any further"'-any evidence tending to
support their allegations would be extremely important.' The judges
who heard the 1987 appeal described the confessions as "the true
foundation of the prosecution case.""1 Finally, because the scientific
evidence pertaining to the explosives had been weakened in the 1987
appeal-though significantly not below the threshold necessary to
sustain the convictions-if other elements of the Crown's case were
also compromised, then it would be more likely that the Court might
find the convictions "unsafe and unsatisfactory. '
The ESDA evidence, and the perhaps begrudgingly decision to
allow the appeal in the face of considerable public pressure, led the
Court to produce a judgment quashing the convictions. 3 To appear
institutionally consistent, the second judgment had to be capable of
80. McIlkenney v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force & Another, 2 All E.R.
227, 240 (1980); Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police & Others, A.C. 529
(1982).
81. Hugh Cailahan & Others, 88 Crim. App. R. 40,42 (C.A. 1989).
82. Under Section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act (1968), judges were empowered to quash
convictions considered "unsafe and unsatisfactory" or where there had been a mistaken
decision on a question of law or a material irregularity in the trial. The meaning of the phrase
"unsafe and unsatisfactory" was developed across decades of criminal appeals. See RICHARD
NOBLES & DAVID SCHIFF, UNDERSTANDING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: LAW, THE MEDIA,
AND THE INEVITABILITY OF CRISIS (2000); ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL
APPEALS 1844-1994 (1996).
83. Questions of what constitutes evidence and how it should be interpreted are, for
appellate judges, inseparable from socio-political and institutional concerns.
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eroding the apparent reliability of the NG evidence, in a manner that
insulated the earlier 1987 decision from retrospective recrimination.
To this end, the Court of Appeal emphasized differences between
the evidentiary matrix available in 1987 and that developed by 1991
so that the earlier commitment to an array of evidence upholding the
conviction to the "beyond reasonable doubt" strandard could be
infused with reasonable doubt, ostensibly on the basis of the new
evidence. As we shall see, the attempt to achieve this result
produced an arguably weak justification in relation to the NG
evidence, because the 1991 Court accepted some of the arguments
rejected in the earlier appeal. Together, the appeals can be
interpreted to suggest complex linkages between the interpretation
of different types of evidence, institutional politics (particularly the
maintenance of judicial credibility), and sensitivities to other
purportedly extra-legal factors-those that are usually understood as
extrinsic to the production and assessment of scientific knowledge.
During the 1987 appeal, Skuse's methods and results had received
considerable criticism from the defense. As we have seen, however,
in the judgment the Court accepted that Skuse had detected some
substance which they combined with Drayton's GC/MS result to
provide conclusive evidence for the presence of NG. In the 1991
appeal, one of the scientists involved in the May Inquiry (Dr. Lloyd)
offered a potential explanation for Skuse's positive Griess test
results, as well as the trouble he had originally encountered cleaning
his testing equipment after the positive results, that could be
consistent with the innocence of the defendants. Lloyd suggested
that the soap used to clean the testing bowls may have led
inconsistently to nitrite contamination, such that if "he [Skuse]
rinsed the first bowl twice, and the second bowl five times, he would
get nitrite contamination in the first bowl but not the second."' The
detergent contamination theory, which in this new narrative was
leading inexorably to a re-examination of the standing of the GC/MS
result, also provided an explanation for why there had been no
positive thin layer chromatography (TLC) results from the samples.
Earlier recourse by the Court and the Crown to the rapid decom-
position of NG was implicitly abandoned.' Notwithstanding the fact
that Skuse had not used a nitrite-based soap, the Court found-in
84. Mclkenny& Others, 93 Crim. App. R. 287,299 (C.A. 1991).
85. TLC was a technique more sensitive than the Griess test but less sensitive than
GC/MS. The Crown had previously explained the negative TLC result on the basis that NG
decomposed rapidly. This meant that it was possible to produce a positive Griess result, and
subsequently, a negative TLC result and under some conditions still detect NG using GCMS.
This provides an illustration of how according to the Duhem-Quine thesis, modification in
frameworks can accommodate results and data.
[Vol. 14:123
28
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol14/iss1/3
Edmond
conjunction with a vague allusion to scientific developments between
1974 and 1991-that "Skuse's evidence at the trial based on his
Griess test is now shown to be unreliable."' Having rendered
Skuse's evidence unreliable, the Court was left with Drayton's posi-
tive, but now uncorroborated, GC/MS finding as the only remaining
NG evidence.
Because of its centrality in the 1987 appeal, it was institutionally
important for the 1991 Court to address Drayton's single positive
result if it intended to quash the convictions. The Court appeared
eager, in its 1991 judgment, to locate and endorse arguments which
compromised the reliability of the GCMS result. Drawing upon one
new finding, and presumably influenced by the changing evidentiary
and social context, the 1991 Court determined that even the GC/MS
result should now be considered unreliable. In her original testing of
the sample, Drayton had identified a small peak at the appropriate
retention time for NG. She testified that there was no other
substance which produced such a peak under similar circumstances.
Once again the issue of the specificity was challenged. Lloyd testified
that during some tests, again for the May Inquiry, he had identified
an unknown substance from the hand of a smoker who "clearly had
not been handling explosives" purporting to show "a distinct peak on
46 at about the same retention time as nitroglycerine."' With no one
able to identify the substance, the judges accepted the existence of
this other entity, explaining that the test chart was there "for all to
see."' Confronted with this new evidence, in conjunction with an
ever-changing case, Drayton modified (perhaps sensibly renego-
tiated) her former position, now recognizing an alternative to NG as
a possibility.89 An unidentified substance that produced a peak "at
about the same time" as NG, observed using different equipment,
now led to the rejection of the previously strongest element of the
scientific case against the accused.'
The fact that the Crown did not contest the ESDA evidence on
appeal and, given the history of the litigation, its inability to defend
inconsistencies in the police testimony, led to this new evidence
being effectively accepted without challenge. Evidence of police mis-
representation and fabrication were sufficient to introduce serious
doubts into review of the safety of the original convictions, even if
the ESDA findings did not translate into evidence directly
86. Mcllkenny & Others, 93 Crim. App. R. at 300.
87. Id at 302.
88. Id.; see also Daston & Gallison, supra note 59.
89. Mcllkenny & Others, 93 Crim. App. R. at 302-03.
90. Despite claims to the contrary, it is possible that the unknown substance was NG.
20021
29
Edmond: Whigs in Court
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
supporting every element of the defense narrative. For example, the
ESDA evidence was used to suggest serious irregularities in records
of interviews, even some that recorded no admissions, and some of
the interviews now alleged to have been partially fabricated were
originally alleged not to have occurred. These concerns arise even
before the issues of the general reliability of the ESDA technique
and its specific application are considered. Perhaps ironically, be-
cause there was no cross-examination from the Crown, the evidence
was accepted ostensibly as reliable and invested with an epistemic
warrant in some ways equivalent to that of the original NG evidence
before and immediately after the trial.91
Based on a very succinct overview of Skuse's evidence, the GC/MS
result, and the fresh evidence about the confessions, it is worth
noting that the changing interpretation of the opinions of Skuse and
Drayton seem to be difficult to explain entirely on the basis of the
NG evidence, even when combined with claims about interim
advances in related sciences. Presumably, other evidence and social
factors, particularly the confessions and the popular calls for the
prisoners to be released, influenced the interpretation and represen-
tation of the evidence. The difficulties encountered by the Court and
police force in dealing with the ESDA evidence seem to have
influenced the interpretation of the previously highly incriminating
NG evidence. The Court's explanation of the reversal of its inter-
pretation of the NG evidence between 1987 and 1991 may not
appear entirely convincing. Here, not only is the evidence unable to
speak for itself, but very similar NG evidence is interpreted quite dif-
ferently on separate occasions, and this interpretation appears to be
inextricably linked to a range of subsidiary social and epistem-
ological changes-such as the contextually devastating impact of the
ESDA findings-which are not explicitly articulated in the judicial
rationalization.
This section is not intended as a critique of judges and judging, but
rather to provide some sense of the historiographical approaches to
expert evidence applied by judges. It provides some indication of the
manner in which decision-making can be linked to the maintenance
91. There is often a conspicuous similarity in the manner in which confidence is vested in
some knowledges to prove guilt and later in other knowledges to quash the convictions. The
later tendency is often equated with factual innocence, especially in popular accounts. In
practice this often leads to a type of reverse asymmetry, where new evidence or techniques are
accepted, even if contested, and used to quash convictions. In such cases we often encounter
recourse to differing burdens of proof-between prosecution and appeal-and their judicial
articulation. Consider, for example, the use of DNA typing evidence by those associated with
the Cardozo Law School Innocence Project. JiM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol14/iss1/3
Edmond
of judicial credibility and the legitimacy of legal institutions."'
Judicial assessments of evidence are not purely epistemological. In
the case of the Birmingham Six there was tremendous media, public,
and political pressure on the Court to acquit. Accepting that it may
be difficult to reconstruct the extent of social and institutional
influences upon judges, they presumably shape the articulation of a
range of evidentiary and procedural interpretations. However, not-
withstanding the explanations that commentators (such as myself)
might attribute, judges are peculiarly reluctant to account for their
decisions on the basis of social pressures and almost without
exception revert to legalistic explanation. Drawing on (and per-
petuating) the existence of a law/fact dichotomy, they tend to explain
their decisions on the basis of law and/or evidence. As in traditional
models of Science, reified images of Law and Fact operate as if they
expunge egregious social contaminants from judicial decisions and
fact-making.
As we have seen, courts are sensitive to the findings of earlier
tribunals and not every explanation (or reinterpretation) of the
evidence will appear convincing. Frequently this will require the
production of evidence capable of being plausibly represented as
new or fresh. The ability to deem some evidence as new offers the
institutional advantage of absolving judges and juries of respon-
sibility for earlier inconsistent decisions because they were not
apprised of a more complete evidentiary record. The earlier per-
formances can be defended, or excused, because it is the new
evidence that requires the later court to reverse. Judges vigilantly
guard the ability to determine what constitutes new evidence and
have developed a jurisprudence around the subject, ostensibly to
prevent counsel from withholding elements of a case in order to have
a second attempt on appeal. In this way judicial historiography is
highly selective. Admissible facts are inextricably bound to legal,
procedural, and institutional considerations such as the need to
publicly rationalize decision-making that frequently involves not
92. For example, earlier decisions are defended or insulated from subsequent reversals and
in most notorious miscarriage of justice cases, responsibility is ordinarily apportioned to
witnesses, police, and scientists rather than judges or juries. Because of the constitutional
centrality of the jury, appellate judges are generally reluctant to overturn jury convictions,
though this does not prevent them from doing so. When judges reverse jury verdicts they
sensitively manage the explanation: Either the constitutionally entrenched function of the jury
is downplayed or differences between the trial and appeal, such as the production of new
evidence, are used to explain the reversal. There is a general reluctance among the judiciary to
imply that a central component in modern adversarial legal systems-the jury-is irrational or
seriously deficient, perhaps with some minor exceptions such as in extremely protracted
complex cases or in occasional extra-curial pronouncements.
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only the resolution of expert disagreement but occasionally the
reversal of earlier resolutions.93
B. Legal Commentary: (Mis) Understanding Miscarriages of Justice
Judicial accounts of law and evidence are not invariably accepted,
especially by non-legal commentators. Where an appellate court ex-
plains that the quashing of a criminal conviction is the legal
equivalent to a finding of not guilty, non-legal discourses frequently
equate them with innocence.' A finding of not guilty often leads to a
reinterpretation of the entire proceedings from a perspective that
privileges the accused's factual innocence and any evidence corro-
borating that interpretation. Usually this involves, as in the examples
of Boulton and Park and the Birmingham Six, an evaluation of all
the earlier expert evidence from the standpoint of the evidentiary
record available and accepted at the conclusion of proceedings.
Adopting this whiggish approach leads historians and commentators
to embark on retrospective recriminations. Whereas judges maintain
an institutional interest in emphasizing differences between pro-
ceedings with different outcomes, we will now turn to an example of
how historians and legal commentators sometimes emphasize
similarities- that the evidence at the outcome was ostensibly
available at the trial-in order to demonstrate flaws in legal proces-
ses.9" This type of account is designed to demonstrate how, and
sometimes why, the legal system is considered to distort scientific
evidence and regularly fails to identify the appropriate value of
evidence.'
93. Sir John May provides some indication of diachronic shifts in the evidence against the
accused in the case of the Birmingham Six. He explains: "In some of the representations made
to me, reliance has been placed on some abstract notion of justice, by reference to which it has
been argued that the convictions of the Guildford Four were clearly wrong and indeed should
never have occurred. Such reliance is impractical." MAY, FINAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 298.
94. For example, a judge presiding at the final (successful) appeal in the Chamberlain
(dingo baby) case, Re Conviction of Chamberlain (1998) 93 F.L.R. 239, 254 (Kearney J.), ex-
plained: "It is rarely that a criminal trial positively establishes the innocence of an accused per-
son. If it does so, it does so by accident.... It is not the court's function to establish innocence
because, in the absence of a conviction, innocence is presumed: no finding is required."
95. The strategic emphasis on similarities and differences has resonances with Schuster's
discussion of historians' commitment to either "revolution" or "continuity" in accounts of
early modem natural philosophy on the basis of the selection and emphasis of their materials,
see Schuster, supra note 38. For more abstract treatment consider the discussion of similarity/
difference relationships in Collins's discussion of replication, COLLINS, supra note 24; see also
GEOFFREY BOWKER & SUSAN STARR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1999); LUDWIG WIT-rGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1963).
As we shall see in the following section, examining the Bendectin litigation, emphasis on
differences between trials, diachronic changes across litigation, and the description of evidence
as significant, similar, or different are all unavoidably linked to images of scientific knowledge
and practice.
96. See Edmond, supra note 43.
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An example of this practice, in an otherwise legally and
theoretically informed discussion of miscarriages of justice, is a
recent account of scientific evidence in the case of the Birmingham
Six produced by Richard Nobles and David Schiff." Notwithstanding
a commitment to some of the critical approaches to the sciences
developed in this Article,98 their account reveals a lacuna between
theory and practice that is neatly captured in the treatment of the
testimony of the defense scientist Dr. Black during the Birmingham
Six trial.
Nobles and Schiff refer to Black's testimony in the following
capacities:
Dr Skuse's evidence was challenged by Dr Black, a scientist and
former chief inspector of explosives at the Home Office. He
questioned the specificity of the Griess test, and was not
satisfied with Dr Skuse's failure to reproduce the positive results
when the samples in question were subjected to other tests.9
97. Other examples of recent work on miscarriages of justice sharing similar conceptual
constraints, even though not of an autopoetic persuasion, include CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER
STRESS 5 (Eric Stockdale & Silvia Casale eds., 1992); RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT
INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996); JUSTICE IN ERROR (Clive
Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1993); JUSTICE, SCIENCE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
(1991); LEGAL ACTION GROUP, PREVENTING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND
INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1993); MANSFIELD & TONY WARDLE, PRESUMED GUILTY: THE BRITISH LEGAL SYSTEM
EXPOSED (1994); MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR (Clive
Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1999); CHRIS MULLIN, ERROR OF JUDGEMENT: THE TRUTH
ABOUT THE BIRMINGHAM BOMBS (1986); VISCOUNT RUNCIMAN, THE ROYAL COMMISSION
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: REPORT (1993); BOB WOFFINDEN, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (1987);
David Bell, The Expert Misleads. The Court Follows, 27 AUST. J. FOR. SCI. 59 (1995); David
Bell, Whose Accountability, Judges or Experts? 2 AUST. J. FOR. SCI. 74 (1994); S. Edwards,
From Scapegoats to Sacrificial Lambs: The Guildford Four Affair, 1989 NEW L.J. 1449 (Oct.
1989); Michael Kirby, Miscarriages of Justice-Our Lamentable Failure?, DENNING L.J. 97
(1991); Jeffrey Miles, Forensic Scence: In the Spotlight or Under the Microscope, 3/4 AUST. J.
FOR. SCI. 3 (1991); Michael C. Porter, The Epidence of Experts, 27 AUST. J. FOR. SCI. 53
(1995); Alec Samuels, Forensic Science and Miscarriages of Justice, 34 MED. SCI. & LAW 148
(1994); Stuart Tipple, Forensic Science: The New Trial by Ordeal?, LAW SOC. J. 44 (Aug.
1986); John Wadham, Unravelling Miscarriages of Justice, 1993 NEW L.J. 1650 (Nov. 1993);
Adrian Zuckerman, Miscarriage of Justice-A Root Treatment, CRIM. L. REV. 323 (1992);
Adrian Zuckerman, Miscarriage of Justice and Judicial Responsibility, CRIM. L. REV. 492
(1991).
98. At some points in their chapter on scientific evidence, Nobles and Schiff postulate the
temporal contingency of scientific evidence and assert that the presentation of scientific evi-
dence in legal settings "accords with its popular perception." NOBLES & SCHIFF, supra note 82,
at 174, 183. On other occasions they provide an essentialized image of the scientific method
and a range of norms and commitments, citing works from the sociology of scientific know-
ledge that are generally highly critical of such approaches. Compare id. at 179, 185-86. with
EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 6. Nobles and Schiff also suggest the existence of a culture
clash between the systems of science and law. See also STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH:
LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA (1994); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Manifest Destiny:
Law andScience in America, 10 METASCIENCE 40 (1996).
99. NOBLES & SCHIFF, supra note 82, at 189-90 (emphasis added).
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They later note as follows:
Dr Hugh Black gave evidence of the cumulative nature of the
tests used for NG. As a scientist, he would not have accepted
single positives unconfirmed by other tests. Even with the
GC/MS test, which is the most sensitive, he would not have
accepted a single test, which confirmed the presence of one
mass. He wanted all three masses associated with NG to be
confirmed. In his evidence to the 1987/8 appeal Dr Black was
fairly uncompromising in asserting that the tests which had been
carried out were insufficient, and that he did not himself ha ve to
carry out such tests in order to reach this conclusion.... On Dr
Black's view neither the evidence of Dr Skuse, who had none of
his Griess test positives confirmed by any other test, nor of Dr
Drayton, who had done only one run and seen a mass of 46 at a
time associated with NG, would suffice. The Court of Appeal
never accepted Dr Black's view even though other scientists at
the 1987/8 appeal supported it. And even at the 1991 appeal the
Court accepted that the single GC/MS result must mean
something, and only rejected it when a plausible innocent
explanation was provided. Whilst the 1991 Court formally
accepted Dr Black's view on the need for Griess tests to be
confirmed, this was largely lip service; they concentrated on the
presence of an alternative explanation for the Griess test results,
rather than rejecting them as inadequate data."°
These passages repeatedly draw upon and reinforce an idealized
methodological and normative ethos for their effect. Unlike Skuse,
Black is portrayed as a good scientist.'01 Subsequent analysis of
Black's evidence is developed in a subsection entitled Good Science.
He is characterized as uncompromising, committed to the cumulative
nature of Science and the reproduction of results. As a Scientist
Black could not accept a single positive result. Carefully managing
these appearances and attributes in an attempt to distinguish the
circumstances leading to the 1987 decision, the authors provide little
indication of the strategic nature of Black's evidence, its integration
into a defense case, its changing reception based on the prevailing
socio-legal climate or the introduction of other evidence such as
ESDA, and the Court's institutional imperative in 1991. Rather,
Black's testimony and the methods underpinning it are portrayed as
methodologically rigorous and obvious. This approach to Black's
100. Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added).
101. The category of "good science" shares many similarities with the empiricist repertoire
described by GILBERT & MULKAY, supra note 39, and COLLINS & PINCH, supra note 46.
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evidence raises a fundamental question: why was Black's evidence
not originally accepted if it was so demonstrably reliable, predicated
as it was upon the proper scientific attitude and techniques? For
Nobles and Schiff the answer is found in the irrationality of legal
procedures, particularly the continuing use of lay judges and juries."
This leads them to lament that despite the support of other scientists,
"The Court of Appeal never accepted Dr Black's view" but merely
provided "lip service. ' °3 Here the converse of Upchurch's assess-
ment of Paul's evidence is occurring. Just as the Attorney-General
should have realized the weakness in Paul's evidence, a rational
system of adjudication would have recognized the intrinsic value of
Black's opinion.
Perhaps curiously, in other parts of their discussion, Nobles and
Schiff refer to extracts from the 1987 appeal in which Black
acknowledged, during cross-examination at the trial, limits to his
evidence."° These observations play no discernible role in the
assessment of the value of his testimony. Instead they are deployed
to illustrate that a practical scientist may be more familiar with the
operation of some techniques than a more qualified chemist like
Skuse.1°5 Similarly, the longer extract above provides little sense of
expert disagreements over preferences in relation to testing and
interpretations of tests-some of which it alludes to-nor the practi-
cal difficulties confronting a forensic scientist, dealing with imperfect
and deteriorating samples, or the corroboration between Skuse and
Drayton. Images of scientific practice are flexibly linked to claims for
(un)reliability.
This analysis is reinforced if we consider the reception of Black's
evidence in the Courts of Appeal. Nobles and Schiff are highly
critical that neither Court of Appeal accepted the opinions of Dr.
Black nor dedicated much attention to them. Rather, as we shall see,
his approach was actually criticized by the trial judge, and that
criticism found endorsement even in the 1991 judgment in which the
convictions were finally quashed. The Courts, in contrast to Nobles
and Schiff, encountered an institutional impediment to accepting
Black's opinion or infusing it with transhistorical value. In 1976 an
application for appeal by the Birmingham Six had been refused. Any
subsequent endorsement of Black's original testimony would have
102. NOBLES & SCHIFF, supra note 82, at 186-87.
103. Id at 188. Here, Nobles and Schiff acknowledge some of the diachronic changes in
the evidence and the ability of appellate courts to resist evidence, even where it may "have left
the original prosecution case in tatters" because they determine what constitutes fresh e.vi-
dence and its legal effect on the safety of the original conviction. Id
104. Id. at 204-05.
105. Id. at 203.
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compromised that decision and any other decision, like the 1987
appeal, that upheld the convictions. To protect the integrity of the
trial and processes of judicial review, the Court had an incentive to
emphasize, as we have seen, the novelty of the exonerating evidence.
These observations are borne out in the 1987 and 1991 judgements.
Black and his evidence are not discussed in the extracted 1987
judgment; the later judgment discussed Black's evidence but in-
oculated it."° Rather than incorporate Black's evidence from the trial
into an ironic reassessment of earlier performances, the Court of
Appeal effectively endorsed the trial judge's original summation:
"The judge [Justice Bridge] then drew attention to Dr. Skuse's
experience, Dr. Black's relative inexperience, the absence of any text
book authority in favour of Dr. Black's theory, and his failure to
carry out any experiments.""
This presents a very different portrait from the image of Black
presented by Nobles and Schiff. Regardless of the (retrospective)
merit of Black's testimony, there may, as Justice Bridge implied,
have been good reasons to question it at the trial. Justice Bridge's
criticism of Black's methodology and evidence raises precisely the
type of predicament that symmetry encourages the analyst to address
and illustrates the flexibility available in the representation of what
comes to be understood as proper scientific practice.
To a considerable degree, the approach adopted by Nobles and
Schiff stems from their commitment to autopoetic theory and their
attendant belief in system-specific communication, including special-
ized scientific communications. This approach privileges Science as a
peculiarly rational pursuit. However, if we cannot always identify-
especially a priori-what constitutes good Science, or if there are
serious and intractable disagreements over whether expert disagree-
ment is genuine-what is often at stake in litigation-then it seems
inappropriate to criticize jury and judicial decisions as irrational,
particularly when we have no independent means of ascertaining the
proper value of the evidence or how it should be evaluated
106. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 84 (1972). The tendency to "inoculate"-
admitting a little evil to prevent a greater one-provides a means of influencing inter-
pretations. In this instance, Black's evidence receives some judicial attention and this makes
criticism more difficult than if he were simply ignored.
107. Mcllkenny & Others, 93 Crim. App. R. 287, 296-97 (C.A. 1991). Nobles and Schiff
also accept the proposition advanced by an appellant's barrister, Michael Mansfield, in his
address to the Court of Appeal in the 1991 appeal:
The problem that it appears has faced Dr. Black in the first place and Drs. Caddy and
Baldock in the second, is that they are scientists with, if I put it this way, immaculate
theory. They are right, but because they have not been able to produce an example, the
court, in a sense has turned its back on that.
NOBLES & SCHIFF, supra note 82, at 201. It is easy to imagine this objection being cursorily
dismissed in litigation with alternative social circumstances or other plausible evidence.
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rationally. These observations are strengthened when we consider
that other groups, such as scientists and journalists, also accepted
and even endorsed the original conviction for over a decade.
Without intending to address the question of factual guilt or
innocence, and suspending judgment on the question of the proper
value of the evidence and its refraction through legal frameworks,
the foregoing analysis provides some indication of the manner in
which not only criminal convictions are constructed, but also how
miscarriages of justice are the product of a range of interrelated
social, legal, and epistemic contingency. Instead of an allegedly
epistemologically warranted reversal, the politics of institutions and
inseparably expert knowledges enable the processes of conviction
and exoneration to be opened to historical and sociological scrutiny.
IV. PATHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN
CONTEMPORARY MASS TORT LITIGATION
The final example is drawn from recent and controversial mass tort
litigation in the United States."° It shifts our attention from the
criminal to the civil sphere-to product liability, the law of
negligence, and the difficulties associated with establishing legal
causation." Unlike the previous examples concerned with just a few
isolated individuals, trials, and appeals, the Bendectin litigation
involved thousands of plaintiffs and many trials and appeals.
Bendectin was marketed as an anti-nausea drug and commonly
prescribed for women with morning sickness."' After several decades
of use (from 1956 to 1983), a few epidemiological studies produced
in the late 1970s raised, somewhat inconclusively, concerns about its
safety. From the early 1980s, some of the many families of women
who had consumed Bendectin during the first trimester of pregnancy
endeavored to sue the pharmaceutical manufacturer, Merrell Dow,
alleging that it had caused a range of birth defects, particularly limb
reduction abnormalities. To sustain their actions, the plaintiffs were
required to prove that on the balance of probabilities Bendectin had
caused their injuries. In the wake of a few initial "victories," the
108. This overview of the Bendectin litigation is adapted from a longer and more
comprehensive discussion by Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Litigation Life: Law-Science
Knowledge Construction in (Bendectin) Mass Tort Litigation, 30 SOC. STUD. SCI. 265 (2000).
109. The seminal work in the field, routinely cited by judges, is HERBERT HART & TONY
HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1985). For alternative analyses, see Margaret Berger,
Elininating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 2117 (1997); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Rebels Without a Cause?
Judges, Scientfic Evidence and the Uses of Causation, in CAUSATION IN LAW AND MEDICINE
83 (Ian Freckelton & Danuta Mendelson eds., 2002).
110. Bendectin was marketed as Debendox in the United Kingdom and Australia.
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number of plaintiffs increased dramatically, resulting in the filing of
numerous suits and the consolidation of cases into joint trials. As it
prepared to defend an escalating number of cases, Merrell Dow
removed Bendectin from the market in 1983.
Considered as a whole, the Bendectin litigation is interesting
because it provides an example of sustained legal and scientific
attention focused on evidence of causation across numerous trials
and appeals from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. The cases provide
an extensive public record of trial and appellate judgments and have
generated considerable legal commentary. Judges and scholars
routinely cite the Bendectin litigation and its historiography to
support the need for alternative means of dealing with the refractory
problems raised by the use of expert evidence in legal settings.
Almost all scholarly accounts describe the Bendectin litigation as
an extreme example of legal pathology.1 ' In the most detailed study
to date, Green characterized it as a demonstration "that the tort
system can go awry." According to Green, "Bendectin is the Taj
Mahal of horror stories about the tort system: the single most
criticized piece of large-scale litigation of all time."'12 As a result,
commentators tend to be highly critical of the civil justice system for
its inability to resolve the Bendectin controversy expeditiously in
favor of the defendant, Merrell Dow. Generally, the concerns of
commentators are focused on the inability of juries, and to a lesser
degree judges, to properly value the great weight of scientific
evidence that demonstrated no legally or scientifically meaningful
correlation between the incidence of birth defects and the
consumption of Bendectin.' 3 What is presented as the overwhelming
weight of scientific evidence in favor of Bendectin's safety operates
ironically to condemn the performance of the U.S. civil justice
system.
Despite some differences in the extent of detail and emphasis,
accounts of the Bendectin litigation by Huber, Green, and Sanders
all attribute responsibility for the protracted litigation to the inability
of the courts to properly value the scientific evidence. For these
commentators the epidemiological record clearly vindicated Merrell
Dow, but the courts and particularly juries failed or took too long to
111. The term is a derivation of the title of Langmuir's influential essay, Irving Langmuir,
Pathological Science, reprinted in 42 PHYSICS TODAY 36 (Oct. 1989).
112. MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 328 (1996). See also NORMAL
LEVITT, PROMETHEUS BEDEVILLED: SCIENCE AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF CONTEM-
PORARY CULTURE 211 (1999).
113. Most of the commentaries insinuate that the legal and scientific outcomes should be
identical, that the legal system can and should identify and reflect what is presented as a non-
problematic, proper scientific valuation.
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appreciate that reality."4 Each of the authors expresses a belief,
exemplified in the following statement by Green, in the existence of
a hierarchy among the various types of evidence presented in
Bendectin trials, and all locate epidemiological evidence at the top:
"There plainly is a hierarchy to these different forms of toxic effect
evidence. Epidemiology is at the top, and structural similarity, in
vitro testing, and case reports are at the bottom....5 These accounts
rely upon and privilege a purportedly epistemologically based con-
junction between the defendant's case strategy and the eventual
judicially-led closure around the primacy of published epidemi-
ological evidence. Consequentially, it caricatures the efforts of the
plaintiffs, their lawyers, and scientists as irredeemable. In this way it
operates as a sociology of error predicated upon an historically
insensitive approach to the contests and development of a judicial
consensus around not only the meaning of the evidence, but also
what should be recognized as evidence in legal fora. The defendant's
case, and implicitly the safety of Bendectin, is vindicated on the basis
of a purportedly clear and convincing epidemiological (read
scientific) record."6
By now a familiar pattern involving the retrospective organization
of evidence into good (reliable) Science and bad (unreliable) Science
should be emerging. Once again, the adoption of more flexible and
contingent models of scientific knowledge and practice will illustrate
how even this leading example of pathological litigation with the
evidence overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant exhibits some
indication of the difficulties endemic to endeavors to broker closure
in response to expert disagreement. As in the previous examples,
opening-up and examining the processes involved in the judicial
114. See KENNETH FOSTER & PETER HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998); PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE:
JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 111-29 (1991); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL:
A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION (1998); Michael Green, Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and
Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw U. L. REv. 643 (1992); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation:
A Case Study in Life Cycles of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992) [hereinafter Sanders,
Bendectin Litigation]; Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on
Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1993). See also RICHARD GOLDBERG,
CAUSATION AND RISK IN THE LAW OF TORTS: SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND MEDICINAL
PRODUCT LIABILITY 102-31 (1999); Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988); Louis Lasagna & Sheila Shulman, Bendectin and the Language
of Causation, in PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 101 (K. Foster et al.
eds., 1993).
115. GREEN, supra note 112, at 37.
116. This is similar to equating the quashing of a conviction in the miscarriage of justice
trials (legal innocence) with factual innocence. In the terminology of White, epidemiology acts
as synecdoche purporting, in the defence account and many judicial reviews, to stand for all
scientific knowledge. See HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT AND THE FORM: NARRATIVE
DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 31-38 (1987).
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closure of the Bendectin litigation introduces a more complex realm
of socio-epistemic contests than the leading accounts suggest. Instead
of according a privileged position to the published epidemiological
record, this approach indicates how the legal closure becomes
intertwined with a historical sociology of competing knowledges and
an archaeology of the legal uses of epidemiological evidence. That is,
investing epidemiology with legal credibility provided an evidentiary
resource to explain and justify resolution.117
In undertaking an examination of the judicial treatment of the sci-
entific evidence in the Bendectin litigation, the most striking feature
is the primary evidential role eventually accorded to published
epidemiological studies that failed to identify statistically significant
associations between Bendectin consumption and birth defects.11
From the very beginning of the Bendectin litigation, Merrell Dow
and their highly regarded and expensive legal advisers concentrated
the legal defense upon the published epidemiological record. The
perceived strength of this record, in conjunction with earlier judg-
ments endorsing the value of epidemiological evidence, facilitated
this approach."9 By the mid- to late 1980s, a number of federal appel-
late courts had come to accept published epidemiological evidence as
the appropriate body of knowledge to resolve the Bendectin liti-
gation. Many of these decisions were outcome-dispositive, effectively
dismissing the plaintiffs' evidence and any chance of success in court.
If the plaintiffs were unable to adduce published epidemiological
studies linking Bendectin with birth defects, then there would be no
further litigation. In practice, the preference for epidemiological
evidence acts as a type of epistemological tautology, a consideration
disregarded by Huber, Green, and Sanders. Published epidemi-
ological studies are characterized as the appropriate type of evidence
to resolve the controversy over causation, and an increase in the
number of published studies unable to establish a statistically
significant association purports to strengthen the appearance of a
scientific (and simultaneously judicial) consensus. This approach
117. As in the example of images of the ideal medical examination in the case of Boulton
and Park, this is not independent of extra-legal approaches to epidemiology or the historical
emergence and recognition of epidemiological evidence in federal courts.
118. None of the forty studies undertaken by 1990 led the authors to confidently conclude
that there were statistically significant associations between Bendectin and birth defects. For a
discussion of the qualified reporting of epidemiological studies, consider David Rier, The Ver-
satile Caveat Section of an Epidenmiology Paper; Managing Public and Private Risk, 21 Sci.
COMM. 3 (1999).
119. One example is the contest over causation in relation to personal injury in the Agent
Orange litigation, Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. N.Y. 1984). See
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might have been more convincing if published epidemiological
studies were the only type of evidence adduced by the parties. But
they were not.
Although some of the more ambiguous epidemiological studies
had actually contributed to anxieties about the safety of Bendectin
and were referred to in many trials, plaintiffs, their lawyers, and
experts were aware that the expanding epidemiological record did
not, at least in terms of statistically significant published results,
support their civil actions. In response, they developed their cases on
the basis of other types of evidence. They drew upon the evidence,
routinely used in regulatory decision-making, of toxicology, in vivo
and in vitro studies, chemical structure analyses between Bendectin
and known teratogens, and the allegedly checkered institutional
history of Merrell Dow, particularly the fact that it had produced and
sponsored questionable research and had earlier associations with
MER-29 and Thalidomide." ° If we adopt a symmetrical approach
and endeavor to explain the production of the judicial-defendant
consensus around the primacy accorded to the published epidemi-
ological record, then the relative weight and meanings of the dif-
ferent types of evidence, especially as the number of studies and
findings changed over time, becomes far more complex than is sug-
gested in the secondary accounts and many of the judgments. The
complexity, however, extends beyond the legitimacy of interdis-
ciplinary hierarchies.
Not only did judges, lawyers, and scientists attribute different
values to the broader evidentiary record beyond the published
epidemiological studies, but there were considerable differences in
the values ascribed to the meaning of the epidemiological evidence.
While the defense and many judges emphasized that virtually every
published study had failed to locate statistically significant asso-
ciations, closer inspection indicates variation between the studies in
relation to the strength of associations found in different types of
alleged birth defects.12, Some types of study were portrayed as more
reliable or relevant than others. In addition, several of the plaintiffs'
experts, including epidemiologists, undertook re-analysis and meta-
analysis of published results and claimed their re-calculations
120. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212
(S.D. Ohio 1985).
121. This provides an example of how legal concerns influence the decision to litigate in
ways that transcend narrow epistemological issues. Contingency-fee lawyers acting for the
plaintiffs generally sought to try particular cases, such as those with limb reduction deformities,
because they offered the largest potential damage awards. But these deformities did not
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demonstrated stronger statistical associations.122 There was also
criticism of the judicial insistence on the conventional standard of
statistical significance set at 0.05 or a relative risk of 2.0."i Ulti-
mately, most of these issues were resolved in a manner that favored
the defendants, but the closure was not as easy or epistemologically
convincing as accounts of the litigation routinely suggest.
Some indication of the difficulty involved in endeavoring to value
the epidemiological evidence properly is provided through the dif-
ferent approaches adopted not only by the parties, but also by judges
across the decade when Bendectin litigation raised logistical, legal,
and social concerns, and by scientists, even those not directly en-
gaged in the litigation. Despite the claim that most, if not all, of the
Bendectin litigation was without merit, most commentators seem to
encounter difficulty identifying a precise moment when the pub-
lished epidemiological record was sufficiently compelling to warrant
the exclusion of all Bendectin cases from courts. Without arbitrarily
adopting some point late in the litigation-which would be to accept
the primacy of the epidemiological evidence-there was disagree-
ment among the protagonists over the meaning of the published
epidemiological record. Contrary to claims by Huber, Green, and
Sanders, it was not only juries who were inconsistent.'24 Scientists
from different fields and even some from similar fields interpreted
the scope and meaning of the evidentiary record inconsistently. For
example, although Green and Sanders would presumably locate
their moment of epidemiological evidentiary sufficiency somewhere
around 1985 or 1986, in 1983 editorials in scientific journals were
highly critical of the litigation, describing it as "lacking scientific
merit."'" This reaction raises the following question: on what basis
did these scientists decide, given that Green and Sanders accept
some initial ambiguity in the evidence, before the bulk of the
epidemiological studies were published? Another difficulty is the
submission of an amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in
relation to the Daubert appeal over admissibility standards from a
122. In the 1993 Daubert appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the majority opinion
was complimentary with respect to the formal reputations and qualifications held by some of
the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. They were not, even at that date, dismissed as charlatans.
123. These are often succinctly explained in judgments. Judges frequently draw upon ear-
lier legal decisions, as often as science textbooks, for their (authoritative) explanations of sci-
entific evidence. This is common for epidemiological evidence and descriptions of DNA typing
techniques.
124. The characterization of jury verdicts as inconsistent, when juries were exposed to dif-
ferent cases, different plaintiffs, different trial tactics, different lawyers, different judges, dif-
ferent scientists, and a changing body of evidence, and fulfilled a different constitutional role
to appellate courts and trial judges is, at the very least, troublesome.
125. SANDERS, supra note 114, at 88 (citing Editorials published in CANADIAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION JOURNAL and DRUG INTELLIGENCE & CLINICAL PHARMACY).
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Bendectin trial as late as 199326 In their brief, a group of eminent
epidemiologists criticized the approach to publication and statistical
significance adopted in several federal circuits. Scientists, including
epidemiologists, did not speak with a unified voice on the appro-
priate way to approach the evidentiary record or even how to
approach epidemiological evidence, and there was no overall
consistency as to the point at which a particular body of knowledge
should be seen to have particular legal effects.
A survey of judgments over the course of the entire litigation does
not clarify the situation. At the beginning of the Bendectin litigation,
before it had become a mass tort, '27 trial judges hearing Bendectin
trials tended to admit all of the non-epidemiological evidence, and
some federal appellate courts not only accepted the admissibility of
the plaintiffs' evidence, but also endorsed verdicts based upon it.
However, from the mid-1980s appellate courts began to exclude the
plaintiffs' evidence, explaining that it was not sufficiently scientific or
reliable to be admitted or that the evidence was insufficient to prove
that Bendectin had caused the specific injuries.1" Despite this
emerging pattern of rejection, in the early 1990s, two appellate judg-
ments, DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. '29 and Turpin v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' endeavored to provide more
extensive reviews of the evidence and the legal standards, and in
1990 a judge who had presided over a Bendectin trial in 1985 that
had consolidated 800 cases admitted the plaintiffs' evidence.3
Further, in the 1993 Daubert judgment, the Supreme Court made no
findings regarding the adequacy of the respective cases, even though
Huber had already written his influential text and Green and
Sanders had published preliminary articles that were highly critical
of the Bendectin litigation.132 To some extent the judicial tendencies
126. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robbins,
Raymond Neutra, and Steven Stellman in Support of Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102). Earlier, in 1985, ten epidemiologists had
appended their names to a letter submitted to the journal TERATOLOGY expressing their
concerns about Bendectin.
127. Sanders, Bendectin Litigation, supra note 114.
128. E.g., Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Richardson v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897
F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 884 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989).
129. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3rd Cir. 1990).
130. Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992).
131. In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1990); In re
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
132. In addition to developing evidential and procedural rules, appellate courts are often
concerned with the merits of certain actions as well as broader considerations about com-
munity acceptance, justice, and the ramifications of decisions. But compare Kumho Tire Co. v
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (Ala. 1999) (examining the .experts' evidence in crit-
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to admit evidence at the beginning of the litigation and then adopt a
far more restrictive approach once some of the implications of those
earlier cases had emerged might be understood to be consistent with
managerial strategies and social and economic anxieties related to
mass tort litigation as much as putatively epistemological orien-
tations.133
Neither courts nor commentators provide much explanation
beyond recourse to authority (often legal) for preferring published
epidemiological evidence to the mosaic of other factors. Their pref-
erence is further compromised by the ambiguous status of pub-
lications once the idealized image of rigorous skeptical peer review is
tempered. This is not to suggest that courts and commentators do
not distinguish between the different types of evidence, but rather, to
open these meta-scientific distinctions to examination."
An example of some convergence between the interests of the
defendant and the concerns of judges confronted with an expanding
congregation of Bendectin cases might be developed in relation to
their respective approaches to publication as an evidentiary or evalu-
ative resource.35 The defendants embraced published epidemiolog-
ical studies because the results supported their position. That said we
should not fall into the trap, on the basis of hindsight, of thinking
that this was, at least initially, legally mandated.'36 Further, appealing
ical detail) with Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 257, 119 S.Ct. at 1180 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority's decision to evaluate the evidence instead of remanding).
133. A few courts modified some of the more onerous requirements, such as the legal
necessity of statistically significant published epidemiological studies, once the "threat" posed
by Bendectin cases had dissipated. See, eg., Deluca, 911 F.2d 941; Turpin, 959 F.2d 1349. It
may have been relatively easy to address the evidence more directly once the litigation had
been effectively shutdown.
134. The a priori commitment to the value of the epidemiological evidence, particularly
normative images of scientific practice such as skepticism and neutrality, seems to invest the
evidence with its value. It might be that while the preferred outcome is not necessarily
determinative in the evaluation of evidence, it remains, nonetheless, highly influential. For
some discussion of the metaphysical frameworks associated with the emergence of the modern
sciences, consider some of the early works by Kuhn and Burtt, EDWARD BURTT, THE
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE (1924); THOMAS KUHN, THE
ESSENTIAL TENSION (1977); THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962).
135. Perhaps those like Callon and Latour, who embrace actor-network theory, might
describe this as an instance of the defendant's enrolment of the judiciary and epidemiologists
and epidemiological studies. See Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation:
Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND
BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE? 196-233 (John Law ed., 1986); Callon &
Latour, supra note 13; John Law & Michel Callon, The Life and Death of an Aircraft: A
Network Analysis of Technical Change, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY:
STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 21 (W. Bijker & John Law eds., 1992).
136. See JASANOFF, supra note 35; John Abraham, Distributing the Benefit of the Doubt.-
Scientists, Regulators, and Drug Safety, 19 Sci. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 493 (1994); John
Abraham, Scientifc Standards and Institutional Interests: Carcinogenic Risk Assessment of
Benoxaprofen in the UK and U.S., 23 SOC. STUD. SCI. 387 (1993); John Abraham & Julie
[Vol. 14:123
44
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol14/iss1/3
Edmond
to pervasive though largely uncritical images of scientific practice,
published studies had the benefit of having been formally peer re-
viewed. If we ignore the fact that litigation inspired the vast majority
of studies, the claim that they were developed away from litigation
enabled them to be presented free of apparent partisanship or the
science-for-litigation stigma. 37 It was no coincidence that the term
"junk science," a highly pejorative characterization of purportedly
unreliable litigation-driven knowledge, disproportionately applied to
plaintiff's evidence, was popularized in the wake of the Bendectin
litigation. 3 Confronted with thousands of potential litigants and the
need to publicly rationalize their decision-making, the appeal of
published epidemiological studies, which identified no statistically
significant association between Bendectin and birth defects and
could be portrayed as impartial and inherently reliable, should not
be underestimated. 39 Merrell Dow sought to restrict the debate
about causation to the evidence that supported its case most directly.
This strategic maneuver was simultaneously developed through the
characterization of earlier judgments, including those from other
mass torts, that had recognized epidemiological evidence as author-
itative. For Merrell Dow, this strategy had the additional benefit that
if judges began to accept epidemiological evidence as the appro-
priate means for assessing causation evidence in mass tort litigation,
then plaintiffs, and more particularly their lawyers and scientists,
would appear disingenuous. In effect they would appear to be, quite
irrationally, arguing against what was being portrayed as consensual
scientific reality.
The approaches adopted in the leading commentaries and some of
the judicial decisions provide a moral framework and chronology
through which to assess the performances of not only individual
actors (lawyers, scientists, judges, and jurors), but also the workings
Sheppard, Democracy, Technocracy, and the Secret State of Medicines Control: Expert and
Nonexpert Perspectives, 22 SC. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 139 (1997); Rier, supra note 118.
Occasionally editors have to consider the social implications of their publications and how
they might influence litigation and regulatory decisions. Consider, for example, the debates
around the reliability of DNA typing evidence in the pages of Nature in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. See also Contested Identities, supra note 6.
137. Edmond, supra note 31.
138. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing "Junk" Science, STAN. TECH. L. REV.
(1998), available at http://stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/Index.htm.
139. In some circumstances, as in this example, judges claim they are adopting scientific
opinions directly from the scientific community. This usually involves an emphasis on reliabil-
ity and a diminution in the role or agency granted to the application of legal standards, other
than one concerned with the sufficiency of the evidence. On other occasions, however, judges
temper the uses or the expediency of appropriations. See supra note 60 (discussing the role of
medical opinion evidence in relation to medical negligence).
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of the entire U.S. civil justice system." They function to compromise
the actions of plaintiff lawyers, plaintiff scientists, and especially the
juries that produced pro-plaintiff verdicts. As in the examples of
Boulton and Park and the Birmingham Six, assessing performances
on the basis of a consensus that developed toward the end of
proceedings-without attending to the production of consensus over
time-is a highly questionable method of explaining the assessment
and representation of evidence in mass tort litigation. It evaluates
judicial decision-making and the various legal and social influences
based on the assumption that the later judicial decisions were cor-
rect, without explaining why epidemiological evidence was privileged
or why the parties adopted particular tactics, introduced a range of
experts, and emphasized different types of evidence.' 1
An alternative approach, sketched tentatively above, suggests that
rather than an instance of legal pathology, the Bendectin litigation
represents an example of the contingency involved in developing
expert knowledges for legal purposes, particularly the persuasive
production of closure. One might explain why lawyers, scientists,
judges, and juries could disagree over what constituted evidence by
recognizing a raft of considerations such as evidentiary shifts over
time; disagreements among scientists; difficulties in assessing a
changing evidentiary record and evaluating different types of scien-
tific evidence; changes in plaintiff and defence strategies; the scale
and resource implications of the litigation; the example of earlier
trials and appellate decisions; the wealth of the defendants; the
reluctance of plaintiffs and lawyers to settle; and the socio-political
composition of juries.
As in the example of the Birmingham Six, it seems curious, if the
plaintiffs, their lawyers, and their scientists were so patently unbe-
lievable or the published epidemiological evidence so convincing,
that U.S. federal courts encountered such protracted difficulty in
resolving the litigation. If the Bendectin litigation is the leading ex-
ample of mass legal pathology, then courts will presumably continue
to encounter extreme difficulties when confronted with evidentiary
contests conceived as more evenly balanced.
Huber, Green, and Sanders suggest that there was an obvious
extra-legal value to the scientific evidence and that the legal system
140. In some ways the criticism and concern resembles instances of alleged scientific
impropriety like the recent episode concerning cold fusion. See GIERYN, supra note 37;
Thomas Gieryn, The Ballad of Pons and Fleischmann: Experiment and Narrative in the
(Un)making of Cold Fusion, in THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF SCIENCE 217 (E. McMullin ed.,
1992). For a discussion of some of the moral implications, see Trevor Pinch, Opening Black
Boxes.: Science, Technology and Society, 22 SOC. STUD. Sci. 487 (1992).
141. See Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 114 (discussing changing
evidentiary strategies in one of his earlier articles on the Bendectin litigation).
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ought to have identified and adopted it. None of their analyses,
because of their restricted epistemological orientation, enables them
to address the question of how the legal system was actively and
constitutively involved in the production and assessment of scientific
evidence, nor how concerns about logistics and the enforcement of
admissibility and sufficiency standards might influence the pre-
sentation and assessment of the evidence, and ultimately our under-
standing of the sciences or the existence of public problems."
In closing, it is important to acknowledge that Bendectin has
recently returned to the market. The entrenched attitudes of senior
appellate courts and an extensive and unsuccessful record of
litigation, perhaps more than the extensive epidemiological record
supporting its safety, may explain its return. Questions about the
safety of Bendectin remain inextricably bound to what is considered
as reliable evidence and how it should be interpreted.
V. CONCLUSION:
LEGAL HISTORIOGRAPHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The three cases provide recent examples of the legal, historical,
and judicial assessment of controversial expert evidence. Notwith-
standing the detailed scholarly treatment of these cases, I have
endeavored to illustrate how questionable assumptions about expert
and scientific evidence have constrained all of the analyses. Assump-
tions about scientific and other forms of expertise have radically sim-
plified important evidentiary dimensions in each of the studies and
inhibited "thicker" descriptions that might have facilitated a history
and sociology of expert evidence, examining the production of
expert opinion evidence not only in the local legal context, but
extending it further afield in an attempt to trace relations to broader
institutional and professional commitments, and social and political
values.'43
142. See JOSEPH GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING-DRIVING
AND THE SYMBOLIC ORDER (1981) (discussing "public problems"). In relation to concerns
about litigation explosions and insurance crises, see Theodore Eisenberg & James Henderson,
Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731-810 (1992); Marc
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986); Marc Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); James
Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability. An Empiical
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990); Michael Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147 (1992); Michael Saks, If There Be a Crisis, How Shall WeKnowltZ 46 MD. L. REV.
63 (1986).
143. Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture, in
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973); see also Harry Collins, Stages in the Empirical
Programme of Relativism, 11 SOC. STUD. SC. 3 (1981).
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Each of the case studies indicates how the assignation of a stable
value to the expert evidence functions effectively to resolve con-
troversy. That assignation does not operate impartially. Rather, it
serves to problematize individual and institutional performances and
limits recognition of the local, dynamic, and strategic contests over
the meaning and application of knowledge routinely encountered in
adversarial legal settings. For Upchurch, the Attorney-General's
decision to obtain no further medical evidence is characterized as a
personal failure and evidence of a Crown conspiracy. The possibility
that the interpretation of the medical evidence changed or was open
to different readings at different times, and that the non-medical
dimensions of the case were considered sufficient for a successful
prosecution, are consequently left unattended. In the final appeal of
the Birmingham Six, the inclusion of institutional concerns and the
broader evidentiary and social matrix may enhance our appreciation
of the changing approach to the evidence of nitroglycerine that was
previously represented as sufficient to sustain the convictions.
Nobles and Schiff downplay some aspects of this remarkable reversal
of the evidence-and the explanation-involved in quashing the
convictions for murder. Consequently, the inability to recognize and
properly value Black's evidence at that time becomes evidence of the
irrationality of legal institutions, rather than an indication of the
contest over propriety, reliability, and credibility occurring in the
context of the broader narratives unfolding during the trial and sub-
sequently through the course of appeals.1" For Green, Huber, and
Sanders, the privileging of statistically significant, published epidemi-
ological studies converted plaintiffs' counsel into cash-crazed lawyers
and their experts into hired guns, willing to testify to the truth of any
theory. The apparent inability of judges and juries to rule
appropriately leads the authors to advocate institutional reform.
In contrast to these approaches, more critical sociological images
of the sciences combined with more historically contingent and
sensitive approaches to evidence, including concern about what
counts as evidence and why it does so, suggest the existence of a
more fluid realm of contestation and negotiation as the actual
content (or in situ meaning) of objective, reliable, and good evidence
was strategically inscribed, contested, and endorsed.'45 Accepting
that images of and commitment to methods, norms, standards, and
protocols can pre-exist litigation, their precise configuration, in any
144. See LANCE BENNET & MARCIA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM (1981); BERNARD JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE (1991).
145. Edmond, supra note 46; Gary Edmond, Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the
"Facts" to Speak for Themselves 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 555 (1999).
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presentation or attempted closure, is often the result of interests and
dynamics manifested in particular litigation, especially the evidence,
experts, and legal avenues available to the parties. For judges ration-
alizing their decisions, appeals to ideals, authority, and impartiality
are often explicitly reintroduced in the assessment of admissibility,
sufficiency, weight of evidence, and the reliability of convictions.
This is meant to enhance the plausibility of their decision and
reinforce the rationality and legitimacy of legal institutions. The
evidence does not have to be presented as determinative, for judges
may privilege legal values and procedures, such as admissibility
thresholds, articulated burdens of proof, or procedural concerns, in
order to exclude or diminish its impact, even the impact of
apparently cogent scientific and expert evidence.
Conventionally, legal procedures, interested parties, and partisan
experts have been understood to distort scientific evidence.1" If,
however, the legal system is not conceived as a debased or inferior
forum distorting pristine extra-legal Science, but as a partially
separate world with its own concerns, constraints, and traditions-
including the availability of cross-examination, the involvement of
lay fact-finders, articulated admissibility standards, burdens of proof,
and rules of procedure-then the production, presentation, and
assessment of scientific evidence might be understood in relation to
the exigencies of context. Indeed, the highly public and highly critical
context may actually facilitate the investigation of some of the
processes involved in the production and valuation of scientific
knowledges in contemporary society."7 As a working axiom, the his-
torian should remember, without being deterministic or reductionist,
that scientific knowledge and its manifestations are always contextu-
ally contingent. "' It may be that we need to develop a special
concept of law-science knowledge, that is, expert evidence developed
in relation to not just the contingencies of a case and the rules of
procedure and evidence, but also tacit assumptions influencing the
production, presentation, and explanation of evidence and its
representation in judgments and commentaries. We might then want
to consider why in some contexts rhetorical emphasis is placed on
truth or reliability, the purportedly epistemic side of legal strategy
and decision-making, and at other times emphasis is laid upon what
146. See, e.g. GOLDBERG, supra note 98; HUBER, supra note 114; David Bernstein, Junk
Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 123 (1996); Note,
Confronting the New Challenges of Scientilfc Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1481 (1995).
147. Given the serious attention devoted to the scientific evidence by the various parties, it
seems to be a curious methodological tendency to disregard, at the beginning of any study, the
local and strategic perspectives developed by the parties that eventually lose.
148. POTTER, supra note 39.
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might be characterized as the legal, ethical, and procedural dimen-
sions. We might also wish to examine the production of boundaries
and maintenance of dichotomies.
Further, commentators adhering to fairly traditional images of
Science may have unwittingly inverted the issue of distortion. Rather
than lament the distortion of scientific evidence in adversarial juris-
dictions, it may be more appropriate to interpret some of the highly
influential representations of Science in legal settings, especially in
the seminal decisions of superior courts such as the U.S. Supreme
Court's Daubert and Kumho judgments,'49 as dominant representa-
tions, highly conspicuous and influential in a range of public debates,
including legal and regulatory fora. The images of Science presented
in Supreme Court judgments may reach a broader audience and be
as influential in shaping public ideas and discourses as those
appearing in the pages of the journals Science or Nature."'
From the foregoing discussion, it seems that the explanation of
scientific disagreement in litigation is inescapably connected to the
image of the sciences underlying the analysis. In effect, once the
model of Science is selected, the litigation more or less explains
itself. Butterfield acknowledged this type of predicament when he
implored historians to reflect upon their theoretical frameworks:
Our assumptions do not matter if we are conscious that they are
assumptions, but the most fallacious thing in the world is to
organise our historical knowledge upon an assumption without
realising what we are doing, and then to make inferences from
that organisation and claim that these are the voice of history.'
149. Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v
Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (Ala. 1999). Recently, in the highly influential Daubert judgment,
the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that one of the key means of assessing the reliability of
scientific evidence was by determining whether the knowledge had been tested (or falsified),
referring directly to the philosophers Popper and Hempel. The majority provided a range of
factors such as the known or potential error rate of a technique or theory, and whether the
claims had been published subject to peer review and generally accepted in the relevant scien-
tific community. Interestingly, this may be interpreted as a derogation from a strict approach
to falsification, as these supplementary factors were some of the types of criteria that falsifica-
tion was designed to eliminate. Very limited scholarly attention has been devoted to the sud-
den appearance of Popper and falsification in the Daubert judgment. See Adwina Schwartz, A
"Dogma of Empiicism" Revisited Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the
Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
149 (1997); see also Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Keeping "Junk" History, Philosophy and
Sociology of Science Out of the Courtroom: Problems with the Reception ofDaubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 20 U.N.S.W. L.J. 48 (1997); Gary Edmond & David Mercer,
Conjectures and Exhumations: Citations of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science
in US Federal Courts (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
150. Michael, supra note 28, develops the idea of popular idealized images of science,
which I have denoted as Science, and more variable and contingent localized understandings.
151. BuTtERFIELD, supra note 4, at 23-24. From an explicitly phenomenological perspec-
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We can assume that historians committed to the categories of good
and bad Science will continue to discover not only charlatans but
also scientists whose impeccable opinions were overlooked by irrati-
onal procedures and incompetent individuals. Those who approach
litigation with more flexible tools may, at least, attempt to investi-
gate how representations of good and bad are strategically produced
in the courtroom and beyond, and explore the complexities involved
in the resolution of expert disagreements and their public rationaliz-
ations. From a methodological perspective, legal commentators and
historians should be reflexive about their descriptions of scientific
practice and knowledge. They should be as skeptical of judicial
representations of scientific evidence as non-originalist legal scholars
examining the representations of the parties or the judges of the
Supreme Court in relation to the interpretation of the U.S. Con-
stitution.152
While the article by Upchurch has the least currency in relation to
contemporary debate about the legal system and law reform, the
same claim cannot be made for the accounts of the Birmingham Six
and Bendectin litigation. Accounts of these cases, purporting to pro-
vide an historical overview of the trials and appeals, are responding
to and actually part of ongoing debates over the meaning of the
litigation and the appropriate practical responses to these legal
failures or pathologies. The account by Nobles and Schiff contributes
to an ongoing discourse about recent high profile miscarriages of
justice, judicial and political responses, and institutional reforms such
as changes to the Criminal Appeals Act (1968) and the creation of an
independent Criminal Cases Review Commission in 1995. Nobles
and Schiff are critical of some of the institutional procedures, par-
ticularly what they describe as the "irrational" lay treatment of
expert evidence. Notwithstanding that their text may be used in
ongoing debates in the U.K., their theoretical framework makes it
difficult, perhaps inappropriate, for them to suggest reforms. Alter-
natively, those commenting on the Bendectin litigation exhibit far
less reticence in advocating reform. With the advantages conferred
by hindsight, Huber, Green, and Sanders propose a variety of
tive, Merleau-Ponty spoke of the "retrospective illusion" of taking "objects constituted by our
perceiving consciousness as pre-existent causes of perception." MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY,
SIGNS, at xiii (Richard McCleary trans., Northwestern U. Press 1964) (1960).
152. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, Histoicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981);
Robert Gordon, The Struggle over the Past, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123 (1996); Mark V. Tush-
net, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); Tushnet, supra note 7. See also supra note 72.
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reforms focusing particularly on admissibility thresholds as well as
on the presentation and assessment of expert evidence.'53
Interestingly, it might be contended that in practice very few of the
proposed reforms would have operated in the ways suggested when
the contest over the legal teratogenicity of Bendectin was actually in
process. They may have influenced the reception of evidence, but
not necessarily in the epistemologically predicated manner the
authors imply. The appearance of neutrality and independence, like
contests over the appropriate methodology and interpretation of
results, are always easier to determine once a controversy has been
resolved.' What is missing from the proposals is recognition of a
tautological loop. The reforms are predicated on questionable
assumptions about the value and meaning of scientific evidence and
the capability of lay participants. However, if the accounts of the
evidence and lay competence are controvertible or fundamentally
flawed, then the reforms may not operate in the manner anticipated
or may actually be unnecessary.
Historical accounts of miscarriages of justice and mass torts have
been central to debates over procedural and evidential reforms in a
variety of jurisdictions during the last two decades.'55 In closing, it is
my intention to provide an indication of some of the consequences of
(mis)understanding the role played by expert evidence in contem-
porary litigation.'56 Without intending to be nostalgic, I suggest that
responses to the Bendectin litigation and a number of other promin-
ent mass torts have been gradually transforming the rights and duties
between manufacturers and citizens. Concerns about "junk science"
and spurious litigation, of which Bendectin suits are conventionally
heralded as a leading example, have led to more restrictive legal
admissibility standards. Higher thresholds reduce the number of
plaintiffs able to "have their day in court." Further, the complexity of
expert evidence and anxieties about the (in)consistency of outcomes
have been combined with ongoing concerns about jury competence.
In response, recent U.S. Supreme and Federal Court decisions per-
taining to expert evidence have invoked the language of resistance.
When making admissibility decisions, trial judges are encouraged to
153. These include the use of court-appointed experts, expert panels, expert juries, and
trial by judge alone. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 114; GREEN, supra note 112, at 193-
211; SANDERS, supra note 114, at 299-351.
154. COLLINS, supra note 24.
155. See, for example, the recent change to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(1975) and the review of English civil litigation by Woolf, LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
FINAL REPORT (1996).
156. In playing with the idea of (mis)understanding, it is my intention to capture both
those advocating law reform on the basis of some belief in the potency of their analysis and
those led by perceived benefits, such as lower insurance premiums or compensation payments.
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act as vigilant gatekeepers. Gatekeeping is ostensibly concerned with
excluding unreliable evidence from courts and protecting jurors.
These approaches elide the politics surrounding the selection of par-
ticular images of reliability, judicial distrust of American publics, or
reduced public access to the legal system, and to a considerable ex-
tent achieve these results in reliance on simplistic models of scientific
knowledge and controvertible historical accounts.
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